I believe what Eldar Mamedov writes always hits the target and is worth considering. He visited Tehran and posted in The American Conservative   his dispatch. First, I give an encapsulation of his argument on Iran. Then I will add some comments. Mamedov Dispatch            Tehran is hunkering down, not buckling. Iran is prepared for round two ( the importance and credibility of Iran’s missile capabilities has been proven ). But Iran is convinced that a diplomatic solution could still be found, although the path through Washington remains blocked. ( This could involve the regional consortium for uranium enrichment, in which Iran would enrich up to around four percent while its stockpiles of high enriched uranium would be shipped abroad ).            Now, Iran is trapped in a diplomatic dead end of Washington’s making. The current path is a sucker’s bet: Iran faces severe punishment for maintaining a “ threshold ” ...

Iran getting itself in the position of being a nuclear threshold state is a major part of the Iran nuclear conundrum. How to deal with an NPT threshold state has not been addressed in the framework of the NPT nonproliferation regime. And Iran is using that to its advantage.            Ray Takeyh has just given us his view in an article titled Trump’s Middle East Order in Foreign Affairs on Dec 4, 2025. Here is an encapsulation of what he writes about Iran and the U.S.            A menacing Iran sits near the nuclear threshold. The Islamic Republic is a problem to be managed, not wished away. The best way to get results with Tehran is through force.            Trump’s biggest accomplishment was the June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Iranian nuclear program has not been obliterated. The Iranian threat has been diminished. Trump, instead of continuing to menace Tehran...

The Iran nuclear conundrum is in a pause, or maybe a stalemate. That is good for Iran, giving them time to build back and build up their missile systems in preparation for the potential next Israeli strikes. Israel, busy with Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and maybe Yemen, doesn’t mind the pause with Iran. The Trump administration, over occupied with domestic matters and with Gaza-Israel, Ukraine-Russia, Taiwan-China, etc., has put Iran on the back burner.            What about IAEA? Unfortunately, there has been more mixing of the political with the technical both at the UN Security Council in September-October and at the IAEA Board of Governors in November. In this face-off, Iran, Russia and China are on one side; and the U.S. and E3 (France Germany and UK) are on the other.            Commentators postulate that the E3 has taken the actions against Iran to demonstrate that it is totally with the U.S., their objective being ...

Headlines of reports on Monday, November 3, 2025, tell the status of the nuclear conundrum.  Trump says curbing Iran nuclear capability central to Mideast peace ( Iran International )  Iran's Supreme Leader says cooperation with US not possible while it backs Israel ( Parisa Hafezi, Reuters )  Iran says Tehran-Washington message exchanges continue, not talks ( Iran International )  Iran President Pezeshkian says Iran will bolster nuclear program, rules out bomb ( Iran International )  60% uranium lies under rubble, no plan to retrieve it, Foreign Minister Araghchi says ( Iran International )

On October 24, 2025, in Responsible Statecraft, Eldar Mamedow wrote that ‘ the world’s major powers are now operating under two irreconcilable interpretations of international law. On one side, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany assert that the sanctions snapback mechanism of the JCPOA was legitimately triggered for Iran’s alleged violations. On the other, Iran, Russia, and China reject this as an illegitimate procedural act. This has created a far less predictable and more fragmented world .’            On Termination Day, October 18, 2025, Moscow’s foreign ministry said Western efforts to restore UN sanctions were “ legally null and void .” And last week, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov issued a statement that contained the message: Russia now considers all pre-2015 U.N. sanctions on Iran, snapped back by the European signatories of the JCPOA, “ annulled .” Moscow will deepen its military-technical cooperation w...

As reported by Iran International, Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, told the media that Russia, China and Iran on Friday, October 24, sent two letters.            One to the UN Secretary General and the President of the Security Council declared: ‘ All provisions of Resolution 2231 have now lapsed, and attempts by European countries to reactivate sanctions through the so-called snapback mechanism are illegal and without effect. ’            The second letter to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), formally expired on Oct. 18: ’ With this termination, the reporting mandate of the Director General of the IAEA concerning verification and monitoring under Security Council Resolution 2231 has come to an end,’ and ‘as of 18 October 2025, this matter will be automatically removed from the Board of Governors’ agen...

As we approach the one-month mark after the Security Council action on September 28 to reactivate UNSC/RES/2231 ‘ snapback ’ sanctions, where is the Iran nuclear conundrum today? Let’s look back at what I forecast as the outcome of the ‘ snapback ’ decision in my September 13, 2025, blog. I listed four possible outcomes with expected reactions by Iran, IAEA and Israel. Of the four outcomes, A, B, C and D, A was the worst. And that is what has happened. Here is my outcome A.  A. Snapback of UNSC sanctions after 30 days  Iran : Stop negotiations with E3. Stop cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites. Threaten to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S. Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines.  U.S. : ?  IAEA : Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, as permitted by Iran. Report Iran’s failures to meet its NPT obligations to Board of Governors, ...

With the occurrence of Termination Day on October 18, 2025, there is the question of just what terminated. UNSC/RES/2231 is clear that the resolution terminates on Termination Day, and the item is removed from the Security Council agenda. That includes Annex B. Statement , whose provisions anyway applied only for 5 to 10 years from JCPOA Adoption Day, which is Termination Day. But what about Annex A. JCPOA?            My reading is that JCPOA has a life of its own and it is not terminated when RES/2231 terminates. But I may be wrong. A verdict by the legal team that produced JCPOA is needed. Here is my evaluation:           Many JCPOA provisions include “ for 15 years ” (see list below) and a couple for 20 and 25 years. There is no start date or reference to a defined date, such as Implementation Day or Adoption Day. There are no provisions that mention “ 10 years ”. And it is remarkable that RES/2231 has no mention of “ 1...

October 18, 2025. Termination Day for UNSC/RES/2231 (2015). And with it, almost all of the JCPOA (a couple measures have longer termination periods).            What about the ‘ snapback ’ sanctions in the six UNSC resolutions of 2006-2010? Did they go in force on September 27 or did they not?            Well, here is what the Russians and the Iranians are saying about that.            On September 26, in the discussion regarding a vote in the UN Security Council on a Russian-Chinese proposed resolution to extend RES/2231, Russia stated, inter alia: Since the Security Council did not adopt a resolution on the technical extension of UNSC Resolution 2231, then it will cease to be in effect in accordance with the established timeline – which is the termination day of the JCPOA, namely October 18, 2025 … there has been no “snapback” and there will be no “snapback.” Any attempts to “resus...

“ Actions speak louder than words .” But Donald Trump has been very talkative about Iran in the past days and during his trip to Israel and Egypt. Here is a compilation of Trump’s reported sayings about Iran and reactions by some others.  Trump welcoming first phase of Gaza peace plan, October 9   " Because of us, the enemies of all civilization are in retreat, thanks to the bravery and skill of the Israeli defense forces and Operation Rising Lion. Great job and my people loved working with you. Many of Iran’s top terrorists including nuclear scientists and commanders have been extinguished from this earth ." " We dropped 14 bombs on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which has been confirmed to have obliterated those facilities and together we helped stop the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism from making nuclear weapons. If we didn’t do that, there would be a dark cloud over this [Gaza] deal. This was our last shot. ”  " When someone told me [Iran] had star...

I think it takes legal training to understand the situation with UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) after next Saturday, October 18, 2025 (which is ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day), with ‘ snapback ’ activated as of September 27, 2025. I have not seen a writeup on this, and I may make some misstatements in this blog.           The following sections of UNSC/RES/2231 are involved:  Main Body. Paras 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 30.  Annex A. JCPOA : Annex IV, Joint Commission; Annex V, Implementation Plan, E, UNSCR Termination Day; F, Other  Annex B. Statement : Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7  Termination of UNSC/RES/2231  JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan, E. UNSCR Termination Day . Para 23 and 24 would have terminated RES/2231 on October 18 and removed this topic from the Security Council agenda, but that has been overridden by ‘ snapback .’  Para 30 of RES/2231 is intriguing: “ Decides to remain seized of the matter until the termination of...

Vali Nasr surprised me the other night in his interview with Christine Ananpour when he clearly stated (twice) that the U.S. had vetoed an agreement reached by the E3 and Iran that would have delayed for 6 months the ‘ snapbac k’ deadline from Oct 18, 2025. As a result, ‘ snapback ’ sanctions went into effect on September 28.            That was at least the second time the Trump administration wouldn’t go forward with an agreement with Iran: [Iranian Foreign Minister] Araghchi … recalled the fifth round of talks he led with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff on May 23…He noted that if "POTUS" reviewed the official minutes of those meetings…he would see how close both sides came to finalizing what could have been a historic nuclear deal. Araghchi alleged. [Amir Daftari, Newsweek, Oct 8, 2025]            Why would the Trump administration have done that? Daftari wrote that Israel played a central role in provoking tensio...

An exchange between President Trump and Iran on October 6 ( reported by Amir Daftari of Newsweek ) showed why successful negotiations look improbable at best.            At the U.S. Navy’s 250th anniversary in Norfolk, Virginia, Trump praised the June 22 strikes on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. “ They were going to have a nuclear weapon within a month. And now they can start the operation all over again, but I hope they don’t because we’ll have to take care of that too if they do. No previous president had the guts to do it ,” warning that the U.S. would act even faster if Iran resumed its nuclear program.            Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei called Trump’s threat a “ criminal and illegal act” that reinforced America’s image as a violator of international law. “ It will be clear to the international community and to the Iranian nation that the United States is a law-breaking country. ” ...

The Iran conundrum is on a side burner for a little while, with Gaza-Palestine and Ukraine on the main burners. It appears that the U.S. administration has little interest in a deal with Iran, preferring military threats as a lead up to more military action. President Trump’s appetite for using his military power may be growing; we see him bragging about ordering the killing of Venezuelans. Recall that he did order the assassination of Suleimani.            Nobody but the Trump administration and Israel is happy about this bubbling situation. Here is a capsule summary of what was said in the past two days, as reported in the Washington Post and Iran International.           Trump administration believes that now is the time to dial up pressure, and that snapback sanctions will “ create the environment ” for “ a diplomatic solution .”            U.S. fuel tankers have been deployed to the ...

Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations published on September 29, 2025, “ The Ripple Effect of UN Sanctions on Iran’s Nuclear Program .” Here is his pessimistic, if realistic, view.            The Iranian regime has survived the war intact. Both Israel and the United States have come out of the twelve-day war believing they can impose costs on Iran with impunity. The country is permeated with fear that a war can restart at any time.             Iran has maintained its redlines. It will not abandon enrichment or discuss its missile program. Exchanging nuclear concessions for sanctions relief has little audience in Iran’s corridors of power. Should there be talks between the U.S. and Iran, they are likely to be quickly deadlocked.   Meir Ben-Shabbat and Asher Fredman published in Foreign Affairs dated September 12, 2025, “ What Israel Wants .” Here is their view.        ...

Iran International and the Tehran Times reported interesting new developments and statements bearing on the ‘ snapback ’ sanctions, U.S.-Iran relations, and Iran’s NPT adherence. Here are highlights: UNSC sanctions are being implemented, President Trump and Iranian leadership are on different planets, and, perhaps most intriguing, the possibility of Iran withdrawing NPT ratification but not its signature. ‘Snapback’ sanctions            The European Council is reinstating a wide range of restrictive measures against Iran: “ Today, the Council agreed to reimpose a number of restrictive measures in relation to Iran's nuclear proliferation activities, that had been suspended with the entry into force of the [JCPOA] in 2015 .” The restored measures include “ both those adopted by the UN Security Council since 2006 with successive UNSC resolutions and automatically transposed into EU law, and EU autonomous measures. ”         ...

Prime Minister Netanyahu meets President Trump again in the White House today. Victor Gilinsky wrote in the Bulletin on Atomic Scientists on September 23, ‘ When Israel tells the United States, as it will, what it expects it to contribute militarily to the next round of attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the US answer should [be, Bibi}, “you may include me out.” ’            Netanyahu stated clearly at the UN General Assembly on September 26, “ Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium…must be eliminated.” "We certainly know where it is. We have a pretty good idea of where it is, " dpa reported that Netanyahu said on September 28.            So, it is easy to imagine that in the White House today Netanyahu will trade going along with Trump on Gaza (for a couple months) for the U.S. commitment to drop more MOABs on Iran (in the coming months).            All that is well understood in ...

Trita Parsi is right (see September 21 blog). The E3 are using Iran as a pawn in their geopolitical maneuvering. Countering Russia and keeping U.S. support are their big concerns. And so, while I predicted correctly the first two UN Security Council votes on ‘ snapback ’, my hoped for third vote to extend RES/2231 did not take place.  To recall, the first vote, on September 19, was the required one to permanently terminate UNSC sanctions and it failed as expected (4 Yes/9 No/2 Abstain). The second vote was on the China-Russia resolution for an extension of 6 months without a snapback mechanism. It took place on September 25 and failed as predicted, but by the surprising same vote as the first (4 Yes/9 No/ 2 Abstain).  The third vote would have been on an E3 resolution for an extension of 6 months with a snapback mechanism. E3 would, I hoped, present and vote for this resolution to avoid the downsides of activating ' snapback ' sanctions. That did not happen. Why can be the su...

Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute has moved the Iran nuclear conundrum into the great power geopolitical sphere. Or rather he is downgrading it’s importance relative to the European need for U.S. commitment and support in the struggle with Russia. He has posted on his Substack and on the Quincy Responsible Statecraft website Europe uses Iran as pawn in transatlantic power play on September 19.            His analysis is a bit complex or better convoluted. The E3 activated the UNSC ‘ snapback ’ mechanism (on August 28) for two principal reasons: punish Iran for its assistance to Russia in the Ukraine war; and curry favor with the Trump administration for staying with Europe in opposing Russia. The fact that it is about nuclear is just convenient.            Parsi also projects that Israel will ‘ finish the job ’ with military action against Iran perhaps at the end of this month (when ‘ snapback ’ goes into force) or...

To judge how governments are viewing the Iran conundrum, here are excerpts from 13 national statements ( available in English on IAEA website ) at the IAEA General Conference, September 15-19, on Iran. The majority of states did not mention Iran, including Brazil, India, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey. Mentions of ‘diplomacy’ are highlighted.  Australia       We remain deeply concerned by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s failure to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in a full and technically credible manner. It has produced and accumulated a growing stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% - for which there is no credible civilian justification. The Agency’s current lack of access to verify the location of this material is alarming. It is essential that Iran promptly resume implementation of, and full compliance with, its legally binding safeguards obligations. Australia notes the Director General’s 9 September announcement with Iran on practical steps to re...

More bad news on the ‘ snapback ’ sanctions front with a No vote in the UN Security Council today on the ROK Chair’s resolution to permanently end UNSC Iran sanctions. But there is a week more to September 27-28 for further action in this complex matter. We will stay tuned. For today, here are developments in advance of that UNSC vote.            On September 18 the Wall Street Journal reported that ‘ Iran made a new offer to E3 yesterday to avoid snapback…The E3 regard Iran's latest proposal as insufficient in substance … without any concrete actions on the Iranian side'.  Iran International reported that on September 18 French President Emmanuel Macron in an interview with Israel’s Channel 12 asked if the return of UN sanctions on Iran was a ‘ done deal ’ responded, “ Yes, I think so. Because the latest news we have from the Iranians are not serious ."            One of the E3 requirements is U.S.-Iran talks un...

The news about the Iran conundrum is anything but encouraging. One could hope for positive signs. But here are highlights from Reuters, Newsweek and Al Jazeera.                 Iranian and E3 foreign ministers made little progress in a September 17 telephone call aimed at averting ' snapback ’ sanctions on Tehran being reimposed at the end of September. Germany's foreign ministry spokesperson said on X that the E3 had " underscored that Iran has yet to take the reasonable and precise actions necessary to reach an extension of resolution 2231 ", adding that sanctions would be reimposed " absent concrete actions in the coming days ".  [ An interesting point is that Germany is not in the UN Security Council and E3 action must be taken by France or the UK .]                The U.S. issued on September 16 a new wave of sanctions against Iran. The Treasury Department said the measures focused o...

Today, we will just try to digest the grim picture that Iran International   has posted in the past two days, including the title, More Iran-Israel confrontations inevitable , and the following.            US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on September 15 pledged unity and opposition to Iran and blessed a European initiative to restore United Nations sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear activities. Rubio said he supported the European initiative "100%."  Rubio said if the Islamic Republic does not "change course," the administration will continue to apply "maximum pressure" sanctions .            Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said at the Iran-Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) conference on September 16 that possible negotiations with the United States will hinge on Washington’s readiness for a deal based on mutual interests without th...

‘ If it wasn’t already clear enough, I will restate the United States’ position on Ira n.’ So says the U.S. National Statement at the 2025 IAEA General Conference, given today by US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, who presented himself as a lifelong energy entrepreneur. That statement said the following about the Iran nuclear conundrum, in the 14th of the 16 paragraphs.            Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway, including all enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, must be completely dismantled. Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA, abide by its safeguards obligations, and provide the IAEA with unhindered access to all sites of concern. Then, and only then, we would look forward to working with Iran to rejoin the world in global trade, bringing opportunity and prosperity to the Iranian people.            So that is the U.S. position on Iran, halfway through the 30-day ‘ snapback ’ mechanism period. Missing is a...

This post follows up yesterday’s posting on the outcome of the snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council. Looking at the requirement to vote on a resolution within 30 days (September 26), here are thoughts on how the voting will go. In the UN Security Council, nine (9) votes are required to pass a resolution; the five permanent members have a veto.  Votes that may be taken by UNSC   1. Resolution to extend RES/2231 with no snapback mechanism for 6 months [Russia, China]  2. Resolution to extend RES/2231 with snapback mechanism for 6 months [E3]  3. Resolution to make permanent the termination of UNSC sanctions under RES/2231 [UNSC Chair, ROK]  Snapback Sanctions Voting (projected ) 2025 Members                                                       For           ...