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Where is the Iran nuclear conundrum today?

As we approach the one-month mark after the Security Council action on September 28 to reactivate UNSC/RES/2231 ‘snapback’ sanctions, where is the Iran nuclear conundrum today? Let’s look back at what I forecast as the outcome of the ‘snapback’ decision in my September 13, 2025, blog. I listed four possible outcomes with expected reactions by Iran, IAEA and Israel. Of the four outcomes, A, B, C and D, A was the worst. And that is what has happened. Here is my outcome A. 

A. Snapback of UNSC sanctions after 30 days 
Iran: Stop negotiations with E3. Stop cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites. Threaten to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S. Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines. 
U.S.: ? 
IAEA: Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, as permitted by Iran. Report Iran’s failures to meet its NPT obligations to Board of Governors, which will make finding that Iran is in noncompliance and report that to UN. Security Council for action. 
Israel: Hold off on military attack. 

        I wrote that, while no one knows what the U.S. would do, experts with Middle East experience are calling for the U.S. to take the opportunity to negotiate a solid and lasting new deal with Iran. And I wrote that I did not see that the Secretary of State/National Security Advisor and the President’s Special Envoy having what it would take to get that done. And the President? Unpredictable. 
        So, where do we stand today? Here’s my ‘take’. 
Iran: Iran is rebuilding its defenses and missiles and digging out bombed sites. The Supreme Leader has stated that it is not in Iran’s interest to negotiate with the U.S. The President stated Iran would not withdraw from NPT. The Foreign Minister has rejected negotiations with E3, and said that the Aug 9 Cairo agreement with IAEA needs reworking. Nevertheless, various officials have continued to offer to negotiate with the U.S. if it gives up its ‘maximalist’ demands on enrichment and ballistic missiles and shows respect. 
IAEA: There were no resolutions on Iran at the September General Conference and Board of Governors, perhaps because it was agreed to wait to see what happened in the Security Council. The IAEA Safeguards Department is probably working to maintain cooperation under Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement. There have been no (publicly known) IAEA inspectors in Iran, after inspections were carried out at the Bushehr power plant and Tehran research reactor. 
Israel: Officials continue to affirm the intention to carry out further military (and/or covert) strikes on Iran, whenever they decide to. But, perhaps too tied up with Gaza, Israel has held off on military attack (while Iranians state they are getting prepared). 
U.S. Lots of ‘words’ from President Trump about Iran to the media or written on social media, with his usual approach to ‘getting to a deal’ - ‘we can have a beautiful future together’, ‘you have never been weaker’ and ‘I will bomb the hell out of you again.’ The Secretary of State likes to say the U.S. is ready to negotiate and lists the ‘maximalist’ demands that are clearly ‘no go’ for Iran, thereby avoiding having to negotiate in the near term. They may believe what some U.S. experts write, that the Iranian regime may collapse in the coming months due to all the sanctions. The result is no U.S. ‘actions’, just ‘words’. 
        What happens with Gaza-Israel and Ukraine-Russia will affect how soon the Iran nuclear conundrum boils again.

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