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U.S. Sanctions, Middle East views

Trump’s special envoy Witkoff has hit the capitals again; in Tel Aviv Netanyahu probably told him to tell Trump that he will take over all of Gaza; in Moscow Putin probably told him to tell Trump that Ukraine will be destroyed and forget the sanctions. Witkoff didn’t get to number 3 on his list, Iran. But Trump played another ‘getting to a deal’ with Iran card, adding sanctions he can later get credit for removing. And the Middle East commentators are worriedly reacting to the Iran situation. Here are some highlights. 

From Newsweek: 
    The U.S. announced on July 30 the largest Iran-related sanctions since 2018, targeting entities and vessels linked to the country's petroleum sector: 20 oil firms, 5 vessel management companies, 1 wholesaler, and over 115 individuals in 17 countries and regions, including the U.K., Italy, Switzerland, India, the UAE and Hong Kong. 
    U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said: "Today's Department of State action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, … marks the eleventh round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales since President [Trump] issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025, ordering a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran.” 
    Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei said the new sanctions were "clear evidence of the hostility of American decision-makers towards the Iranian people.” He accused Trump of suffering from a ‘chronic addiction to unilateralism’ and relying on ‘pressure tactics in pursuit of illegitimate goals.’ 
    Iran said it won't base its economic strategy on any resumption of nuclear talks with the U.S. and warned it has ways to overcome sanctions if Washington rejects its conditions. 
Gharibabadi, a member of the Iranian negotiating team, said Iran is awaiting a possible [U.S.] response to the preconditions Iran set for resuming nuclear talks, including financial compensation and guarantees against military attack. 

From Alhasan & Hokayem in Foreign Affairs, Aug 4, 2025: 
    Look past the fragile cease-fire between Iran and Israel and one can see the conditions for enduring uncertainty and future conflict: Iran’s likely decision to start rebuilding its nuclear and missile programs, Israel’s proclivity for preventive military aggression across the region and unpredictable U.S. leadership. The [12-day] war will likely only harden Iran’s resolve to acquire a nuclear deterrent to protect against future attacks—setting the stage for further rounds of conflict. 
    It is undeniable that Iranian-Saudi relations are better now than at any time in the past 20 years. The Gulf states’ thaw with Iran was aided by Israel’s decimation of the Islamic Republic’s regional network of allies .... With Tehran’s regional capabilities severely limited, the Gulf states … are now more willing to accept a deal that limits Iran’s nuclear program but doesn’t necessarily deny it the ability to enrich uranium for the country’s medical research or energy needs. The Arab Gulf states should step in to mediate a lasting deal between Iran and the United States, however slim the chances of success. 

 In sum, chances are seen to be slim of avoiding further military action by Israel, with at least Trump’s acceptance if not participation. Iran is likely to go slow, play nice and not rock the boat, hoping that achieving greater Israel will occupy Netanyahu for an extended period and maybe in the meantime he will be removed from office.

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