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Snapback: The 30-day process has begun

On August 28, 2025, Britain, France and Germany initiated in the UN Security Council a 30-day ‘snapback mechanism’ process that can restore UN sanctions on Iran that were modified under JCPOA in 2015. All U.N. sanctions on Iran would be reimposed in 30 days unless the Security Council takes other action. [UNSC/RES/2231, paras 36, 37] Here is where matters stand on August 28, 2025. 

At the request of the E3, the Security Council is to meet behind closed doors on August 29, 2025, to discuss the snapback move. [Reuters] 
The UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting  within 30 days. [JCPOA, para 37]  What the applicable procedures are for that vote are not crystal clear.
 
Possible extension: Iran and the E3 have held several rounds of talks aiming to agree to defer the snapback mechanism. 
Russia and China have circulated a draft resolution to the Security Council that would extend the nuclear deal until April 18, 2026. Their text includes language that would block the E3 from reimposing U.N. sanctions on Iran.
 
Russia and China positions: 
 • Germany, France, and Britain have not followed the dispute resolution process in the JCPOA. [JCPOA paras 36,37] The E3 disagree. 
 • Germany, France, and Britain do not have legal standing to trigger a snapback of U.N. sanctions because they have not met their own obligations under the JCPOA.
 
Iran position: If the provisions of previous UNSC resolutions are applied [through the snapback mechanism] in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA [UNSC/RES/2231 para 13; JCPOA para 37]. Iran has threatened to respond, including by withdrawing from the NPT.
 
Interim agreement: A possible way to stabilize the situation while extending the snapback mechanism, thereby reducing the risk of further military action and creating time for negotiation of a new nuclear deal. Such an agreement should address Iran’s legitimate concerns about further military attacks by solidifying the ending of the 12-day war and recognizing Iran’s NPT right to a peaceful nuclear program under IAEA safeguards [Davenport ACA Aug 28].

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