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“They asked for the attacks to stop”

With the world’s spotlights focused on Israel-Gaza, it seems that “all’s quiet on the Iran front.” We imagine that Iran is digging out at Fordow and Isfahan and probably Natanz. We await news of the resumption of IAEA inspections in Iran, at the nuclear power plant Bushehr and other nuclear locations not bombarded by Israel. And we wonder what other nuclear activities Iran might be undertaking in this period of calm. 

Here's what Foreign Minister Araghchi is reported to have said over the weekend (by The Jerusalem Post):
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said, in an interview with the Iranian Student News Agency, that Iran could still strike Israel despite the blows the republic took in June. “The aggression has stopped, and in turn our right to defend has stopped. That’s it. There is no ceasefire agreement; there is nothing else. They stopped the aggression without any conditions, and we stopped the defense. When there is no aggression, naturally, there is no reason to defend ourselves. So, since they asked for the attacks to stop without any conditions, we accepted. Everything can resume. They can resume, we can resume. There is no official ceasefire, and everything is possible, and it is not just Iran that should be worried and concerned.” 

They asked for the attacks to stop without any conditions.” And the attacks stopped! Is Araghchi referring to just a tweet by Donald Trump? We don’t know. It was remarkable that the “12-day war” stopped, just like that. Why doesn’t Donald Trump do the same with the Israel-Hamas war? 

Israeli political and military leaders have continued to state that they will attack Iran again any time they decide it is necessary. Donald Trump has said the same. Araghchi said “They can resume, we can resume.” All this gives the sense that more is coming around the bend. But let’s hope not.

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