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Three weeks to 2025 IAEA General Conference

Hugh Chalmers of VERTIC wrote in the Bulleting of Atomic Scientists on August 12 about reestablishing IAEA safeguards in Iran after the June Israel/U.S. attacks. Two points are of particular interest. 
1. Chalmers properly raises the importance of the 2025 IAEA General Conference on September 15-19 at which the Iran issue will be a topic. He writes the following: 
        IAEA member states differ on the legality of the military strikes and the IAEA’s statutory role and mandate to respond to them. These differences may be put on display at the September [IAEA General] Conference. If they are, member states will need to agree on some language that reinforces existing prohibitions and restrictions in this regard whilst retaining buy-in from Washington. A clear expression of restraint from member states—including from the United States—at the general conference could go some way to reassuring Iran that it will not be punished for complying with its safeguards agreement. 
        Yes, it will be interesting to see how all that pans out. Let’s hope that we will see the Member State restraint that Chalmers calls for. 
2. Chalmers, in struggling with how Iran-IAEA relations can be brought back to normal, comes up with the following suggestion. 
Tehran could rebuild its relationship with the IAEA by inviting the agency to return to Iran outside the context of safeguards inspection. The two parties could discuss opportunities for IAEA assistance relating to any nuclear safety, nuclear security, and radiation-protection issues created by the strikes. This could involve or result in a “fact-finding” mission to the damaged sites—led by the IAEA director general… 
        Would that Middle East politics were so simple. Diplomat DG Grossi leading a technical tour of the bombed sites! Hugh Chalmers, Iran has banned Grossi from visiting Iran. 
        No, the big issue is Iran’s enriched nuclear material. If Iran reports significant quantities to IAEA, Israel and the U.S. can be expected to attack again - both Netanyahu and Trump enjoy spouting that with grinning faces. 
        That leads to looking back at Herbert Lin’s preliminary thoughts on the outcome of the U.S. strikes, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on June 23. Here are two of his points. 
1. Actual battle damage assessment will be difficult… Those outside Iran are unlikely to be given access to damaged facilities to see the results… Iranians won’t be letting anyone in to examine it. 
        Two months on, those predictions stand correct. 
2. If there is no regime change… future political or diplomatic arrangements with Iran on its nuclear program will be most unlikely. Without regime change, the US attack … is likely to be just the first of many such attacks in the future… 
        There is no regime change in sight. And Iranian officials talk of war with Israel restarting at any moment. Hopefully, someone will come up with a peaceful way forward. But it is hard to see one with Netanyahu ready to take on everyone, everywhere, and the E3 apparently determined to push Iran off the cliff to withdrawal from NPT.

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