Skip to main content

Snapback “Tempest in a Teapot” heats up

With a week to go to the August 29 deadline set by the E3 (Britain, France, Germany) for when they will decide to try to activate the so-called “snapback” provision of UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) and JCPOA, the tempest is stirring the teapot. 
‘Hats off’ to Amira El-Fekki of Newsweek for her reporting on this. Here are some notable statements this week. 

Abbas Araghchi, Iranian Foreign Minister: "[E3] think the snapback is the only tool they have. Here we have clearly explained our position: first, you have basically no right to use it as you, too, have effectively withdrawn from the deal following the U.S. withdrawal, and with your recent positions, including the zero enrichment. So you're no longer a participant in the JCPOA, and the right to snapback belongs only to remaining members." 
Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia's permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna: "The [E3] are themselves in violation of RES/2231 and the JCPOA. Therefore, legally speaking, they as violators don't have the right to launch Snapback." 
Lin Jian, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson: "China stays committed to peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means, opposes invoking Security Council 'snapback' sanctions." 

The E3 must know their position is shaky, with Trump, occupied with a dozen higher priority things, putting “obliterated” Iran on the back burner. What the E3 have come up with was reported by Yonah Jeremy Bob in The Jerusalem Post on Aug 19, 2025: ‘[Iran] can either give up uranium enrichment for some period of time …or jump at the E3’s interim concessions offer: to extend the expiration of the global sanctions snapback mechanism by around six months from October 2025 until April 2026.’ 
That got a clear response by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi on August 19: "All three countries [Russia, China, Iran] believe that Resolution 2231 should be terminated at its designated time [October 18, 2025], and that [E3] legally have no right to trigger the snapback mechanism and are opposed to reinstating Security Council resolutions." 

For full background on the ‘snapback’ mechanism, look at my blogs: 
    June 07, 2025 Snapback sanctions: “tempest in a cup of tea” 
    June 10, 2025 Iran’s defense against an IAEA Board resolution and UNSC snapback
    July 17, 2025 Europeans threaten Iran with sanctions 
    July 19, 2025 E3 Grasping at Straws 
    July 25, 2025 E3 Snapback and Rafael Grossi in Singapore

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

‘New war with Israel at any moment’, ‘still digging through rubble’

The news about Iran has taken an ominous tone in the last couple days. Here is some reporting and commentary.  Newsweek on August 18, 2025, reported that Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said ‘ We are not in a ceasefire; we are in a stage of war. No protocol, regulation, or agreement has been written between us and the U.S. or Israel. A new war with Israel could break out at any moment .’  Yonah Jeremy Bob commented in The Jerusalem Post on August 19, 2025, that ‘ Khamenei can either “drink from the poisoned chalice” of diplomatic concessions … or face more airstrikes, possibly next time some targeting him directly ’.   Bob also noted that ‘ right now Iran is still digging through rubbl e’. The U.S. attacked Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan on June 22. Two months of digging. No surprise that there has been no public news about that.
Post a Comment
Read more

Assessing possible outcomes of the snapback mechanism

The initiation by the E3 of the 30-day snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council makes everything more difficult and there is great uncertainty about the outcome. Will it be peaceful with a new nuclear deal with Iran, negotiated by the U.S., endorsed by the UNSC and verified by IAEA, or will Iran withdraw from NPT with further military action by Israel and the U.S.?                 To perhaps shed a little light on what the outcome will be, here is my analysis of how the players - Iran, U.S. and E3 - may be assessing the acceptability of the range of outcomes. Four levels of acceptability were used: 1 Fully acceptable; 2 Less acceptable; 3 Just acceptable; and 4 Not acceptable. Four near term 30-day outcomes are listed, and two optimistic outcomes with an interim U.S.-Iran agreement reached within a 6-month extension.                 For the 30-day near term, the best outcome would b...
Post a Comment
Read more

‘Making nuclear fuel’ under the NPT

It is with some hesitation that I take issue with the latest publication of the renowned Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni on August 15 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, titled: “ Actually, the NPT doesn’t guarantee a right to make nuclear fuel .”  But someone should defend the IAEA and international safeguards! Here are points in question.            ‘ The [NPT] treaty was designed to prevent dangerous bombmaking activitie s.’  NPT is far more complex than that. It is common to state the three pillars of NPT: nuclear disarmament; nuclear nonproliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Nonproliferation involves the commitment of non-nuclear states not to pursue nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA inspection to confirm that commitment is being followed. Perhaps Sokolsky intends to refer to INFCIRC/153, which lays out how IAEA and the state cooperate to carry out that confirmation. If so, INFCIRC/153 is not designed to ‘prevent’...
Post a Comment
Read more