How serious would ‘snapback’ sanctions be for Iran?

Newsweek’s reporting on the potential effect of the UN Security Council ‘snapback’ sanctions had a significant difference between August 21 and 22.

Amir Daftari wrote on Aug 22: ‘With the August 31 [E3] deadline approaching, Iran faces … the potential return of sweeping U.N. sanctions on its economy.’

That makes the snapback sound serious. But Amira El-Fekki wrote on August 21: ‘The return of U.N. sanctions on Iran would include an arms embargo, missile and drone restrictions, bans on most nuclear activity, and travel, banking and asset freezes on designated Iranian entities and individuals.’

[Iranian Foreign Minister] Araghchi dismissed their effectiveness. "The economic sanctions of the Security Council are far more limited than the current unilateral U.S. sanctions. Things will not become any worse than the current situation. Yes, from a psychological and political, and even strategic point of view, there are consequences, but not to the extent that it would bring diplomacy to a dead end or paralyze the country."

What Araghchi said is similar to what Richard Nephew said during the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists webinar on May 14, Iran Update: What happens now?: ‘the effect on Iran of snapback sanctions would not be large since U.S. sanctions have already covered most everything’ (I reported that in my June 7 blog).

That is why I have been calling the discussion of snapback sanctions a “lot of tempest in a cup of tea.”

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