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What Iran and Israel Want: What Experts Think

Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations published on September 29, 2025, “The Ripple Effect of UN Sanctions on Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Here is his pessimistic, if realistic, view. 
        The Iranian regime has survived the war intact. Both Israel and the United States have come out of the twelve-day war believing they can impose costs on Iran with impunity. The country is permeated with fear that a war can restart at any time. 
         Iran has maintained its redlines. It will not abandon enrichment or discuss its missile program. Exchanging nuclear concessions for sanctions relief has little audience in Iran’s corridors of power. Should there be talks between the U.S. and Iran, they are likely to be quickly deadlocked. 

 Meir Ben-Shabbat and Asher Fredman published in Foreign Affairs dated September 12, 2025, “What Israel Wants.” Here is their view. 
        Israeli leaders have not changed their goal of preventing Iran from rebuilding its nuclear and ballistic capabilities after the June campaign. Israel is willing to strike again if necessary. Israel insists on enforcement arrangements that would prevent Iran from enriching uranium on its soil, controlling a nuclear fuel cycle, or advancing the weaponization of its nuclear capabilities. Israel also wants to prevent Iran from producing ballistic missiles and precision weapons. 

And on October 1, 2025, the U.S. issued new Iran-related sanctions. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “In support of the United Nations Security Council snapback of Iran sanctions, Treasury is targeting Iranian weapons procurement networks that help maintain its ballistic missile and military aircraft programs.” ( A bit surprising that with ‘maximum pressure’ imposed, they came up with more sanctions.) 

        In that context, it is difficult to take seriously President Trump’s optimistic talk about peace between Iran and the U.S. and a peaceful Middle East.

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