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Military Threats (U.S. and Israel) vs. De-escalation (Everyone else)

The Iran conundrum is on a side burner for a little while, with Gaza-Palestine and Ukraine on the main burners. It appears that the U.S. administration has little interest in a deal with Iran, preferring military threats as a lead up to more military action. President Trump’s appetite for using his military power may be growing; we see him bragging about ordering the killing of Venezuelans. Recall that he did order the assassination of Suleimani. 
        Nobody but the Trump administration and Israel is happy about this bubbling situation. Here is a capsule summary of what was said in the past two days, as reported in the Washington Post and Iran International.

        Trump administration believes that now is the time to dial up pressure, and that snapback sanctions will “create the environment” for “a diplomatic solution.” 
        U.S. fuel tankers have been deployed to the U.S. base in Qatar, supporting the purpose of the snapback sanctions to “pave the way for military threats.” 
        Further military action against Iran could trigger waves of regional instability. “Diplomacy has to be the way forward,” said an Arab official. 
        This is a dangerous gambit,” said Vali Nasr. “The bottom line is this: If the United States actually starts negotiating with Iran, it would be de facto cessation of hostilities between Israel and Iran,” 
        European official: “The diplomatic door is still open, and we don’t believe in a military solution to the proliferation crisis.” 
        Senior Arab government official: “The region today cannot go through the same Iranian-Israeli war or the other wars of the last two years. The cost is too high, de-escalation” is the only alternative. 

        What can stop this march of Netanyahu and Trump to war with Iran? Hopefully that question has high priority in other capitals.

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