Skip to main content

Trump-style “Diplomacy”

An exchange between President Trump and Iran on October 6 (reported by Amir Daftari of Newsweek) showed why successful negotiations look improbable at best. 

        At the U.S. Navy’s 250th anniversary in Norfolk, Virginia, Trump praised the June 22 strikes on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. “They were going to have a nuclear weapon within a month. And now they can start the operation all over again, but I hope they don’t because we’ll have to take care of that too if they do. No previous president had the guts to do it,” warning that the U.S. would act even faster if Iran resumed its nuclear program. 

        Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei called Trump’s threat a “criminal and illegal act” that reinforced America’s image as a violator of international law. “It will be clear to the international community and to the Iranian nation that the United States is a law-breaking country.” Baghaei added that Iran has “no plan for negotiations” with Washington.

        And on October 5, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi told foreign diplomats in Tehran. “Now [E3] have used this lever and seen the results. The three European countries have definitely diminished their role and almost eliminated the justification for negotiations with them.” He added that the European trio “will have a much smaller role than in the past” in any future talks over Iran’s nuclear programme.

        So, who could successfully negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran? I would like to see a group of NPT non-nuclear weapon States step up and take the lead. 

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

‘New war with Israel at any moment’, ‘still digging through rubble’

The news about Iran has taken an ominous tone in the last couple days. Here is some reporting and commentary.  Newsweek on August 18, 2025, reported that Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said ‘ We are not in a ceasefire; we are in a stage of war. No protocol, regulation, or agreement has been written between us and the U.S. or Israel. A new war with Israel could break out at any moment .’  Yonah Jeremy Bob commented in The Jerusalem Post on August 19, 2025, that ‘ Khamenei can either “drink from the poisoned chalice” of diplomatic concessions … or face more airstrikes, possibly next time some targeting him directly ’.   Bob also noted that ‘ right now Iran is still digging through rubbl e’. The U.S. attacked Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan on June 22. Two months of digging. No surprise that there has been no public news about that.

Assessing possible outcomes of the snapback mechanism

The initiation by the E3 of the 30-day snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council makes everything more difficult and there is great uncertainty about the outcome. Will it be peaceful with a new nuclear deal with Iran, negotiated by the U.S., endorsed by the UNSC and verified by IAEA, or will Iran withdraw from NPT with further military action by Israel and the U.S.?                 To perhaps shed a little light on what the outcome will be, here is my analysis of how the players - Iran, U.S. and E3 - may be assessing the acceptability of the range of outcomes. Four levels of acceptability were used: 1 Fully acceptable; 2 Less acceptable; 3 Just acceptable; and 4 Not acceptable. Four near term 30-day outcomes are listed, and two optimistic outcomes with an interim U.S.-Iran agreement reached within a 6-month extension.                 For the 30-day near term, the best outcome would b...

‘Making nuclear fuel’ under the NPT

It is with some hesitation that I take issue with the latest publication of the renowned Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni on August 15 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, titled: “ Actually, the NPT doesn’t guarantee a right to make nuclear fuel .”  But someone should defend the IAEA and international safeguards! Here are points in question.            ‘ The [NPT] treaty was designed to prevent dangerous bombmaking activitie s.’  NPT is far more complex than that. It is common to state the three pillars of NPT: nuclear disarmament; nuclear nonproliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Nonproliferation involves the commitment of non-nuclear states not to pursue nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA inspection to confirm that commitment is being followed. Perhaps Sokolsky intends to refer to INFCIRC/153, which lays out how IAEA and the state cooperate to carry out that confirmation. If so, INFCIRC/153 is not designed to ‘prevent’...