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JCPOA isn’t over, is it?

With the occurrence of Termination Day on October 18, 2025, there is the question of just what terminated. UNSC/RES/2231 is clear that the resolution terminates on Termination Day, and the item is removed from the Security Council agenda. That includes Annex B. Statement, whose provisions anyway applied only for 5 to 10 years from JCPOA Adoption Day, which is Termination Day. But what about Annex A. JCPOA? 
        My reading is that JCPOA has a life of its own and it is not terminated when RES/2231 terminates. But I may be wrong. A verdict by the legal team that produced JCPOA is needed. Here is my evaluation:
        Many JCPOA provisions include “for 15 years” (see list below) and a couple for 20 and 25 years. There is no start date or reference to a defined date, such as Implementation Day or Adoption Day. There are no provisions that mention “10 years”. And it is remarkable that RES/2231 has no mention of “15 years” (or 20 or 25 years). 
        JCPOA Annex V. Implementation Plan, has two relevant provisions: 
E. UNSCR Termination Day, paras 23 and 24 state that: provisions and measures imposed in RES/2231 would terminate “ten years after Adoption Day.” 
F. Other states that: The terminations in Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates. 
        What else could F. mean than that JCPOA defines the application periods for its provisions, independently from RES/2231? And therefore, termination of RES/2231 applies only to UN Security Council consideration of this matter. And one can add, for the moment. Because it can be expected that the IAEA Board of Governors will be passing its finding(s) of Iran’s noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement to the Security Council, sooner or later. 

For the record, here is a listing of the “15 years” paragraphs referred to above. 
Annex A. JCPOA - Application periods for provisions 
“For 15 years” 
Operative Paragraphs 
A.5, A.7    Uranium enrichment long term plan 
C.15          IAEA speedy access 
Annex 1. 
E.18-26     No reprocessing and related 
F.28          Enrichment maximum 3.67% 
F.31          Enrichment only at Natanz 
F.40          Enrichment testing only at Natanz 
F.45          No enrichment at Fordow 
F.46          1044 IR-1 centrifuges maximum at Fordow 
F.50          Stable isotope production at Fordow 
J.56          Uranium stockpile maximum 300 kg @ 3.67% 
J.58          No conversion to UF6 
N.67          IAEA monitoring for JCPOA access 
P.71          IAEA access to Natanz 
P.72          Enrichment solely at Natanz 
P.73          Export of enrichment technology

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