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Termination Day

October 18, 2025. Termination Day for UNSC/RES/2231 (2015). And with it, almost all of the JCPOA (a couple measures have longer termination periods). 
        What about the ‘snapback’ sanctions in the six UNSC resolutions of 2006-2010? Did they go in force on September 27 or did they not? 
        Well, here is what the Russians and the Iranians are saying about that. 

        On September 26, in the discussion regarding a vote in the UN Security Council on a Russian-Chinese proposed resolution to extend RES/2231, Russia stated, inter alia: Since the Security Council did not adopt a resolution on the technical extension of UNSC Resolution 2231, then it will cease to be in effect in accordance with the established timeline – which is the termination day of the JCPOA, namely October 18, 2025 … there has been no “snapback” and there will be no “snapback.” Any attempts to “resuscitate” the anti-Iranian UN Security Council resolutions that were in effect until 2015 are null and void...The UN Secretariat, of course, has no grounds for renewing the relevant mandates. Any attempts to do so would constitute a violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter. 
        On October 17, Moscow’s foreign ministry said Western efforts to restore UN sanctions were “legally null and void, and cannot impose any legal obligations on other states," adding that after the expiration of Resolution 2231, Iran’s nuclear program should be treated like that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
        On October 18, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said Iran believes “no decision has been taken in the Security Council to bring back the lifted resolutions,” citing opposition from Russia, China, and several other Council members. 

        What is the response of the E3 and the U.S.? I wait to see what they have to say now that Termination Day has arrived, and Russia has the Chair of the Security Council in October. 
        If you want to know what the actions of the U.S. administration are, rather than President Trump’s flowery words, here is an excerpt from the Russian statement in the Security Council commenting on the French statement after the vote: 
        The most important fact, which was voiced today by the Iranian Foreign Minister, concerns [France] directly. I refer to the fact that there was a draft agreement between Iran and the E3, which was supposed to be approved and subsequently prevent the crisis. But your big brothers in the United States did not allow you to go ahead with this agreement. 
        Ali Vaez put the Iran nuclear conundrum this way, speaking to AFP: “Iran remains skeptical of the utility of engaging with the US given its history with President Trump, while Washington still seeks a maximalist deal.”

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