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October 18 and ‘Snapback’ - What happens?

I think it takes legal training to understand the situation with UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) after next Saturday, October 18, 2025 (which is ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day), with ‘snapback’ activated as of September 27, 2025. I have not seen a writeup on this, and I may make some misstatements in this blog.
        The following sections of UNSC/RES/2231 are involved: 
Main Body. Paras 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 30. 
Annex A. JCPOA: Annex IV, Joint Commission; Annex V, Implementation Plan, E, UNSCR Termination Day; F, Other 
Annex B. Statement: Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7 

Termination of UNSC/RES/2231 
JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan, E. UNSCR Termination Day. Para 23 and 24 would have terminated RES/2231 on October 18 and removed this topic from the Security Council agenda, but that has been overridden by ‘snapback.’ 
Para 30 of RES/2231 is intriguing: “Decides to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8.” That doesn’t explicitly take account of the implementation of ‘snapback’. 
JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan, F. Other. Para 26 is important. It provides that JCPOA commitments that have ‘sunset’ dates greater than 10 years continue beyond October 18, 2025. That applies to the following: 
        At Natanz, Uranium enrichment and R&D only. Maximum enrichment of 3.67%. Maximum    stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% uranium hexafluoride - 15 years 
        At Fordow, no enrichment; conversion to nuclear technology center. - 15 years 
        No accumulation of heavy water beyond limit - 15 years 
        No reprocessing facility or reprocessing R&D. - 15 years 
        IAEA monitoring of Uranium ore concentrate production - 25 years 
        IAEA monitoring of centrifuge rotors and bellows - 20 years 
None of those are currently in force. But if JCPOA were to be rejuvenated, they could be reactivated.
‘Snapback’ sanctions in UNSC Resolutions 
The first part of Para 12 is clear that the 6 UNSC resolutions in Para 7.(a) have come back in force as of September 27. I assume that termination of these resolutions will require a UNSC resolution, with veto possible. 
Annex B Provisions 
The second part of para 7.(a): ‘measures in paras 7,8, 16-20 terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise’ needs interpretation. Most important is Para 7.(b), which brings in all the paragraphs of Annex B, Statement. Subparagraphs deal with ballistic missiles, military equipment, freezing funds, marine inspection, etc. And most of those subparagraphs have a specified termination date, ranging from 5 to 10 years from Adoption Date (October 18, 2015). So, all those provisions run out on or by October 18, 2025. Or does the activation of ‘snapback’ bring them back into force, and if so, for how long? 

I expect that we will see some fireworks at the Russian-led Security Council in the coming week up to October 18.

For the record, here is (abbreviated) text of the relevant sections of RES/2231. 
UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) 
12. Decides…that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution … to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then [on] the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council …, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) …shall apply…, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. 
7. Decides…: 
         (a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated; 
        (b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B. 
8. Decides… that on the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day… all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated, and none of the previous resolutions described in paragraph 7 (a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item “Non-proliferation” will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized; 
16. Decides…to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B…; 
17. Requests Member States seeking to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B to submit proposals to the Security Council… 
18. Requests the Secretary-General… to facilitate communications with Member States and between the Security Council and the Joint …; 
19. Requests the IAEA and the Joint Commission to consult and exchange Information…, and requests further that the exporting states cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA; 
20. Requests the Joint Commission to review proposals for transfers and activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B …. 
30. Decides to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8. 
Annex A. JCPOA 
JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission 
JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan 
E. UNSCR Termination Day 
23. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur …10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. 
24. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue. 
F. Other 
26. The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates. 
Annex B: Statement 
2. All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance… by the Security Council: 
        (a) the supply, sale or transfer … to, … Iran… of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 … as well as any further items … that could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities …, 
        (b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance… related to … the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and 
        (c) acquisition by Iran of an interest … in another State involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, … except that approval in advance by the Security Council shall not be required for … equipment [that] is for light water reactors, low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 … in assembled nuclear fuel elements … as well as items… set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 2 only when for exclusive use in light water reactors. 
……. [more details] 
This paragraph [2.] shall apply until the date ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day… 
        3. eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day [ballistic missiles]
        4. eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day [delivery systems]
        5. five years after JCPOA Adoption Day [military equipment] 
        6.(a). ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day 
        6.(b). five years after JCPOA Adoption Day [arms transfer] 
        6.(c). eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day [freezing funds] 
        6.(d). eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day [freezing funds] 
        6.(e). five years after JCPOA Adoption Day [travel restrictions]         
        6.(f). ---- 
        7. --- [maritime inspection]

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