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Iran versus IAEA DG Grossi

There is unfortunate linkage between IAEA’s nonproliferation role in Iran and global politics. To make progress in resolving the Iran nuclear conundrum, it is important to achieve separation of those two strands. And that will not be easy. 
        IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has been campaigning for the UN Secretary General position for much of this year. The UN Secretary General nomination process for the 2027-2031 term opened on November 25 and on November 27 the Argentine government formally proposed Rafael Grossi. It is to be expected that will be a major focus for Grossi in the first half of 2026. The UN Security Council is scheduled to select its preferred candidate in July 2026. Once the Security Council has agreed on a candidate they are expected to be appointed by a vote of the UN's General Assembly. 
        Iran International reported on December 16 that Amir Saeid Iravani, Iran’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in remarks to the UN Security Council, signaled Iran’s opposition to Grossi becoming UN Secretary General, saying Rafael Grossi's silence on US-Israeli attacks on Iran showed he did not value international law. Iravani said: “A candidate who has deliberately failed to uphold the UN Charter—or to condemn unlawful military attacks against safeguarded, peaceful nuclear facilities - undermines confidence in his ability to serve as a faithful guardian of the Charter and to discharge his duties independently, impartially and without political bias or fear of powerful States, as required under the Charter.” Iravani said a UN Secretary General must have “a clear and non-derogable responsibility” to safeguard member states' rights and their equal participation in the global system. “Failure to do so weakens the United Nations and erodes the principle of sovereign equality at the heart of the UN system.” 
        Iran has expressed those views about DG Grossi since the 12-day war in June, and went as far as to ban him from visiting Iran. 

        The powers that be need to see to it that those politics do not interfere with reaching a positive conclusion in the ongoing IAEA-Iran consultations on NPT safeguards implementation.

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