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Everyone is talking about Iran

Iran International posted on December 22 a flurry of articles reporting what was being said about Iran by spokespersons from the U.S., Iran, Israel, Russia and IAEA. Here are highlights. 

U.S. and Israel 
        Senator Lindsey Graham on December 21 in Israel said the United States should strike Iran again: “If there’s credible evidence that Iran is going back into the enrichment business at other sites, that they’re trying to build more ballistic missiles to terrorize Israel and maybe Europe, that we hit them before they can do that.” 
        President Trump said any attempt to revive Iran’s program without an agreement would prompt further US action. 
        Axios reported on December 22 that Israel had warned the United States that Iran’s missile drills could be used as cover for preparations for a surprise attack.
 
Iran and Israel and U.S. 
        Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi said during a visit to Moscow: “We are ready to give full assurances that our program is peaceful and will remain peaceful forever. This is exactly what we did in 2015, and it worked.” 
        Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei rejected any discussion of Iran’s military capabilities, saying: “Iran’s defensive capabilities are by no means an issue that can be discussed.” Iranian state media reported missile drills in several cities on December 22. 
        Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said he planned to discuss Iran’s nuclear activities and broader regional threats with US President Donald Trump during his December 29 meeting, adding that both countries’ “basic expectations” of Tehran had not changed. 
        U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee referred to Trump’s repeated public position on Iran’s nuclear program: “… he consistently has said Iran is never going to enrich uranium, and they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon.” 

IAEA and Iran and Russia 
        IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said last week in an interview with Russian state media: “We are only allowed to access sites that were not hit. If they say it is unsafe and inspectors cannot go there, then inspectors must be allowed to confirm that this is indeed the case. That determination has to be made by the agency.” 
        Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi criticized the IAEA: “It is deeply regrettable that the agency and its director-general did not condemn the attack on a peaceful nuclear facility that was under IAEA safeguards. We are a committed member of the NPT and ready to cooperate with the agency, but we have a simple question: how should a nuclear facility that has been attacked be inspected? There is no precedent for this.” 
        Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Iran could not be expected to resume full cooperation with the agency while feeling exposed to attacks and political pressure: “Moscow backs efforts to resume talks between Iran and the IAEA, but only on a fair basis that Tehran views as balanced and consistent with the agency’s mandate.”
        Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said Iran believes the current safeguards framework cannot be applied in the same way after military attacks. “This framework was written for ordinary circumstances. When nuclear facilities and materials are damaged in a military attack, the conditions are different.” He said granting access to Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan while security threats persist could endanger Iran, and added that Tehran is considering other ways to account for nuclear material without inspectors entering the sites. 

        That last statement - 'considering other ways' - is an encouraging piece of news. 

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