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How to Deal with an NPT Threshold State

Iran getting itself in the position of being a nuclear threshold state is a major part of the Iran nuclear conundrum. How to deal with an NPT threshold state has not been addressed in the framework of the NPT nonproliferation regime. And Iran is using that to its advantage. 
        Ray Takeyh has just given us his view in an article titled Trump’s Middle East Order in Foreign Affairs on Dec 4, 2025. Here is an encapsulation of what he writes about Iran and the U.S. 

        A menacing Iran sits near the nuclear threshold. The Islamic Republic is a problem to be managed, not wished away. The best way to get results with Tehran is through force. 
        Trump’s biggest accomplishment was the June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Iranian nuclear program has not been obliterated. The Iranian threat has been diminished. Trump, instead of continuing to menace Tehran, has declared victory and invited Iranians to talk. Trump may saddle his successors with a vexing Iran challenge. They may have little choice but to bomb the country again. 
        The Iranian nuclear challenge could again rear its ugly head. Iran is waiting for the moment when the United States becomes distracted with other crises and Israel loses its focus. Then, it will resume its nuclear program with alacrity. Washington must be ready to respond with attacks. Military intervention is now the instrument of counterproliferation in Iran. 

        Military intervention is now the instrument of counterproliferation in Iran. Wow! Takeyh gives no credit to the NPT safeguards regime, or even to its expansion with a nuclear deal, like JCPOA. His judgment is that NPT is not effective for a nuclear threshold state. 
        I believe this needs discussion. I would like to believe that IAEA safeguards including verification and monitoring can be effective for a nuclear threshold state. Is that wishful thinking? 

Ray Takeyh is an Iranian-American scholar, former U.S. Dept of State official, and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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