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Strategic patience is the right plan for now

David Barnea, head of Israel's Mossad intelligence agency, said on December 16 “The idea of continuing to develop a nuclear bomb still beats in [the ayatollahs’] hearts. We bear responsibility to ensure that the nuclear project, which has been gravely damaged, in close cooperation with the Americans, will never be activated. The ayatollahs’ regime woke up in a moment to discover that Iran is exposed and thoroughly penetrated, yet Iran has not given up its aspiration to destroy the State of Israel. Iran believes it can deceive the world again and realize another bad nuclear agreement. We did not and will not allow a bad deal to come to fruition.” 

        We did not allow a bad deal to come to fruition. That is a boast of the Israeli government that their June 13 attack on Iran stopped Steve Witkoff from reaching a deal with Iran at the scheduled June 15 meeting. 

        We will not allow a bad deal to come to fruition. That is a declaration to the Trump administration by the Israeli government: If you negotiate a deal with Iran, it better not be a bad one or we will “mow the lawn’ in Iran. 

Conclusion: a policy of strategic patience is the best plan for now for Iran and the nonproliferation community, waiting for a more reasonable government to come to power in Israel. Unfortunately for Iran, that means the continuation of U.S. ‘maximum pressure’.

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