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The Day After

Kelsey Davenport and Richard Nephew, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists webinar yesterday, placed emphasis on the major uncertainty about “the day after.” Richard said that striking the military gong, as Israel has, changes all the theorizing that had been done about how the Iran conundrum might be resolved. It’s going to take some serious thinking to digest that. 

An important point they both made was that Netanyahu’s (and others) goal of regime change in Iran is not an “assured nonproliferation strategy.” The replacement may feel a greater need for a nuclear deterrent against Israel and the U.S. Or it may not. We cannot know. 

IAEA DG Grossi told the UN Security Council on June 13 “I have also been in contact with our inspectors in Iran and Israel. The safety of our staff is of paramount importance. All necessary actions are being taken to ensure they are not harmed.” He told the BBC on Monday that IAEA has not been able to carry out inspections since the attacks. Also on Monday he was reported as saying that IAEA inspectors would remain present in Iran and inspect the nuclear facilities “as soon as safety conditions allow.” 

Kelsey had earlier posted “Israel has just ensured that there will be no inspections for some time.” Kelsey stressed that the return of IAEA inspectors to Iran to verify the new situation should be given high priority. Kelsey and Richard both acknowledged that uncertainty about uranium inventory is likely; some UF6 cylinders may or may not have been destroyed, or they may have been moved to safety. If everything that was there before is there for verification, that would be wonderful. IAEA inspectors must do that verification. But when will it be safe for their return?

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