While awaiting the IAEA DG’s comprehensive Iran report to the Board of Governors to be derestricted by the Board, two statements responding to the report are available on Iran’s Foreign Affairs website (en.mfa.gov.ir). They are appended at the end of this blog.
It is disheartening to see that the IAEA Board is so polarized on the Iran issue. Iran accuses the JCPOA E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom) and the U.S. of using the IAEA against them. The E3 and U.S. accuse Iran of preparing to breakout to go nuclear, against their commitment as an NPT member.
As a long-standing staff member, consultant and supporter of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, it is painful to see Iran making unjustified accusations about the Department’s politization under pressure from the E3 and the U.S. Yet, some of Iran’s points in the two statements ring true.
I will comment on some points in Iran’s two statements. Those are emboldened in the texts below.
Statement of Iranian FM and the AEO of Iran
[T]he Islamic Republic of Iran, based on a principled approach founded on constructive interaction with the IAEA within the framework of its rights and obligations stipulated under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
[T]he comprehensive report …, although acknowledging Iran’s cooperation, does not reflect the actual level of such cooperation.
Iran's cooperation and engagement with the Agency, as well as its transparent and confidence-building approach in the Agency’s verification activities
CSA Article 3 calls for Iran and the IAEA to “cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards”. Iran wants to counter a potential Board finding that it is in noncompliance with Article 3, i.e., on cooperation. If Iran’s interaction had been “constructive,” this whole mess would not have developed. Iran has instead chosen to cooperate or not cooperate in selected areas. It would in my view definitely be credible to find that Iran has not been “constructive” in its cooperation.
[T]he improper distinction between obligations under the NPT and voluntary commitments under the JCPOA is another fundamental flaw of this report.
The report goes beyond the Director General’s mandate.
Here I believe Iran may have a point. The Director General has expressed his serious concern about Iran’s growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium in several public fora. The DG’s pronouncements should not be interpreted as a statement by the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The IAEA mandate extends only to verification of safeguards agreements and carrying out instructions by the UN Security Council (i.e., JCPOA verification). If statements in the comprehensive report go beyond that, Iran is correct. We can judge that when the report is made public.
Statement of Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister
[I]t must be emphasized that so long as a country’s nuclear activities are under the IAEA’s monitoring, there is no cause for concern.
Sorry, Mr. Gharibabadi, there is no cause for concern when the IAEA’s safeguards conclusion is that all nuclear material in the state remains in peaceful use. IAEA has not and will not draw that broader safeguards conclusion for Iran until open NPT issues are resolved and Iran meets the NPT safeguards norm, including implementing its Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1.
[T]he Director General has neither the right nor even the obligation to designate a lawful activity as one of concern.
We shall, perhaps, see how Director General Grossi responds to this attack on his statements of his “serious concern.”.
Modified Code 3.1, which pertains to the early declaration of nuclear facilities, does not constitute a safeguards obligation.
Here Iran tries to defend its actions by making use of the idea of “obligations.” But the fact of the matter is that adherence to the NPT is a voluntary action by a State, under which it takes on obligations, one of which is to have and implement an NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA. States have agreed that the original Code 3.1 on early design information should be modified, and almost all States have voluntarily accepted modified Code 3.1 as part of their safeguards agreement. Iran is a holdout and
refuses to accept modified Code 3.1. Without it, Iran will never get the broader safeguards conclusion. That is Iran’s “voluntary” choice.
Iran has implemented de-designations of experienced inspectors.
Iran has the right to de-designate inspectors that it had accepted for designation in their state. The objection to their action in this case is that the de-designations are justified with a political reason. Iran has used its right to refuse to designate any American inspectors, and it can do the same with inspectors from the E3. It is regrettable that Iran’s stated reason for this is that the E3 is threatening to initiate UN Security Council snapback sanctions under the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism. Even if the E3 backs away from taking that action, as I believe it should, it is doubtful whether Iran would in the future designate inspectors from France, Germany or the United Kingdom.
[A]mong the 32 countries that have concluded safeguards agreements without Additional Protocols in force—of which Iran is one—21 out of 100 safeguarded nuclear facilities are located in Iran.
This is the only mention of the Additional Protocol in the two statements. Iran wants to minimize any discussion of its suspended Additional Protocol (AP). That’s because Iran wants to avoid discussion of the fact that it is the principal State that is not in line with the current NPT safeguards norm of a CSA (with Modified Code 3.1) and an Additional Protocol (see below). Iran makes a big deal about the AP being voluntary (as it does for Modified Code 3.1). Of course that is voluntary. Joining NPT is voluntary. Being voluntary is not the point. The point is that after the Iraq debacle, States agreed on the AP as a necessary part of comprehensive NPT safeguards. And 142 States have an AP in force.
Iran tries to buttress its refusal by quoting 32 countries without an AP. Here is a list of States that have signed an AP but not brought it into force, and States that have not signed an AP. States with significant nuclear programs are in bold. Argentina and Brazil have a bilateral safeguards agreement implemented by ABACC, and to date have not added an AP with IAEA. Israel and Pakistan are non-NPT States. DPRK has withdrawn from NPT. Besides Iran, that leaves only Iran and Saudi Arabia (which is in the early phases of getting a nuclear program going). That tells the true story of Iran not accepting to put its AP in force permanently.
Signed: Algeria, Belarus, Iran, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nauru, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zambia (11)
Not signed: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei, DPRK, Dominica, Grenada, Israel, Lebanon, Micronesia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, Venezuela, Yemen. (33)
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Joint Statement of the Iranian FM and the AEO of Iran regarding the report of the director general of the IAEA to the Board of Governors meeting
In view of the recent report issued by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, contained in document GOV/2025/25 dated 31 May 2025, the Foreign Ministry and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran deem it necessary to put emphasis on the following points:
The governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States of America have repeatedly violated their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Security Council Resolution 2231, while simultaneously resorting to imposing illegal unilateral sanctions and pressures against the Islamic Republic of Iran in breach of principles of international law. At the November 2024 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, these countries, through an unjustified political move and regardless of the achievements of the Director General’s visit to Iran, presented a resolution against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This approach resulted in the lack of support from many members, exposing the political and destructive nature of the resolution’s sponsors.
The stance once again proved that the European troika and the US are not sincere in their claims to preserve the IAEA's credibility and in their efforts to reach an agreement. They have spared no effort to use the agency for leverage in the ongoing political process.
Despite serious reservations regarding the content and direction of the Board of Governors’ resolution dated November 21, 2024 and legitimate opposition to the approach of the European troika and the US as the resolution’s sponsors, the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on a principled approach founded on constructive interaction with the IAEA within the framework of its rights and obligations stipulated under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, has sincerely continued its extensive cooperation with the agency. In this regard, the Director General of the IAEA has visited Tehran twice, and Iran has also hosted the Deputy Director General for safeguards on two occasions.
Unfortunately, despite such broad cooperation on part of Iran, the comprehensive report prepared, although acknowledging Iran’s cooperation, does not reflect the actual level of such cooperation. In the report, the Director General, by relying extensively on forged documents provided by the Zionist regime, has reiterated previous biased and unfounded accusations. The allegations leveled in the current report are based on a few claims about undeclared activities and locations from past decades. This is while Iran has repeatedly declared that it has had no undeclared nuclear sites or activities. At the same time, Iran has given the IAEA access to the alleged locations, allowing sampling, and providing detailed information and explanations on various occasions regarding the history of the alleged sites, providing the necessary cooperation with the agency.
Other claims in this report revolve around issues such as Iran’s sovereign right to accept inspectors, Modified Code 3.1, the joint statement, enrichment levels, and reading intentions. As for the appointment of inspectors, while the IAEA currently has appointed 125 inspectors for Iran, the cancellation of the mandate of a small number of them based on the sovereign and indisputable rights of the Islamic Republic (Article 9 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement) is a completely normal action and is in line with the rights of member states of the treaty.
At a time when Iran continues to cooperate with the IAEA under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the issuance of joint statements, the released report makes references to minor, irrelevant, and extra-mandate issues.
The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to stipulate that the improper distinction between obligations under the NPT and voluntary commitments under the JCPOA is another fundamental flaw of this report. The report has been prepared in a way that some of Iran’s voluntary actions are incorrectly presented as binding safeguards obligations, whereas the legal basis for such an interpretation is not supported by the agency’s foundational documents nor does the Islamic Republic have such legal commitments. Meanwhile, invoking unreliable and misleading information provided by the Zionist regime as a non-NPT party possessing weapons of mass destruction and responsible for the most heinous crimes against humanity, including genocide, contradicts the professional verification principles of the IAEA.
These points lead the Islamic Republic of Iran to conclude that the structure and content of the report are unbalanced and fail to comprehensively and accurately evaluate the factors affecting the current situation, including the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA and the fundamental non-compliance of European countries with their commitments under the deal. While voicing regret over the publication of the report, which was prepared with political objectives through pressure on the agency, the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly protests its content. The report goes beyond the Director General’s mandate and conflicts with the professional requirements governing international organizations, including the principle of impartiality.
The repetition of baseless allegations that cannot lend credibility to these claims, coupled with voicing too much concern in this regard, serves merely as a pretext for political propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is while the fake Israeli regime, without being a signatory to the NPT, possesses a nuclear arsenal and simultaneously threatens the peaceful nuclear facilities of an NPT member nation. Unfortunately, despite his legal duties and repeated requests from the Islamic Republic of Iran to condemn these threats, the IAEA Director General has taken no action.
The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses deep regret about the Director General’s lack of impartiality and his disregard for professional conduct under political pressures in the preparation and publication of the report. The Islamic Republic also warns against any political exploitation of the report's contents and reiterates the following:
-According to a fatwa issued by the Leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution, nuclear weapons have no place in the nation's defense doctrine;
-In accordance with fundamental principles of international law, there is no prohibition or restriction on the inherent and inalienable right of any country to peaceful nuclear energy;
-Iran’s enrichment program is solely for peaceful purposes, fully transparent, under complete IAEA supervision, and in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
-Had it not been for the political motives and hypocrisy of the European troika and the US at the agency, such an unfair and repetitive report would have had no justification.
- In conclusion, it is emphasized that should certain countries seek to misuse Iran's cooperation and engagement with the Agency, as well as its transparent and confidence-building approach in the Agency’s verification activities or the current report during the Board of Governors meeting, the Islamic Republic of Iran will adopt and implement appropriate measures in response to such an approach, in order to safeguard the country’s legitimate rights and interests. The consequences and responsibility for such actions will rest with those countries.
Kazem Gharibabadi statement in response to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report concerning Iran.
The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has released his new report regarding certain safeguards-related matters pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, I wish to convey the following points:
First, the IAEA’s Director General has cited the November 2024 Resolution as the mandate for the preparation of this report. Regrettably, the resolution in question was adopted in a political move by the three European states and the United States in the Board of Governors without consensus and with total disregard for the outcomes of the Director General’s visit to Iran. It is unfortunate that the Director General, in the present report, has made no reference whatsoever to this disregard for his mandate by those states.
Second, the entirety of this report pertains to the alleged presence of a limited amount of nuclear material at four purported locations more than two decades ago, based on a series of fabricated data provided by the Zionist regime. Notably, nowhere in the report is there any ambiguity concerning Iran’s current nuclear activities or any deviation in its nuclear materials or operations. In this regard, several points merit consideration:
All allegations pertaining to Iran’s past nuclear program were, pursuant to the November 2015 Resolution following the conclusion of the JCPOA, formally closed. The IAEA’s current actions are, therefore, in explicit contradiction with the provisions of the resolution in question and constitute a political attempt to resurrect unproven and misleading allegations.
The IAEA itself states in the report that two of the four locations in question—namely Lavizan-Shian and the so-called Marivan—are no longer considered outstanding issues. The emphasis placed on these two matters and their reappearance in the report serve no purpose other than to repackage old, unsubstantiated allegations into an inflated dossier for the purpose of renewed political exploitation against Iran.
As to the other two sites—Varamin and Turquzabad—it must be underscored that Iran has furnished the IAEA with the necessary explanations and supporting documents, including during two recent visits by the Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards to Tehran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has had no undeclared nuclear materials or activities, nor does it currently possess any. It is a matter of record that extensive documentation and explanations have been submitted to the IAEA regarding these two sites, the allegations concerning which date back more than twenty years. While all of Iran’s nuclear materials and activities are under the IAEA monitoring and verification and no deviation has been observed, the magnification of these two alleged issues and the exaggerated expression of concern thereon is a mere pretext to fabricate a contrived sense of alarm—particularly in a region where the Zionist regime remains outside all instruments of weapons of mass destruction disarmament treaties and is armed with such weaponry, while the Agency and the claimant states lack the courage to take any action.
Third, although the IAEA claims in its report that “these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material,” it also explicitly affirms elsewhere in the same report that “the Agency has found no credible indications of the existence of an undeclared structured nuclear program currently being implemented in Iran, and it takes note of statements by Iran’s highest authorities that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic law.” This acknowledgment by the IAEA reveals that, under political pressure from certain states, the Agency has been reduced to an instrument for reopening previously closed files, thereby exerting pressure on Iran.
Fourth, another issue raised in the report that lies entirely outside the scope of the IAEA’s assigned mandate is that of 60% uranium enrichment. The report states: “Although enrichment activities under safeguards are not prohibited per se, the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State producing and accumulating uranium enriched up to 60% continues to be a source of serious concern and has drawn international attention in view of its potential proliferation implications.” On this point, it must be emphasized that so long as a country’s nuclear activities are under the IAEA’s monitoring, there is no cause for concern. According to Agency instruments, there exists no limitation on the level of enrichment, and the only relevant restriction is the prohibition on the diversion of such activities or materials to non-peaceful purposes.
Within this framework, the Director General has neither the right nor even the obligation to designate a lawful activity as one of concern. Mr. Grossi’s action in this regard is entirely political and aligned with the interests of certain specific states, for which he must be held accountable.
Fifth, another extraneous matter raised by Mr. Grossi in the report relates to Modified Code 3.1. It must be acknowledged that following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the failure of the three European parties to fulfill their obligations under the agreement, the Islamic Republic of Iran—in execution of the Strategic Action Law enacted by the Islamic Consultative Assembly—suspended the implementation of its voluntary nuclear obligations beyond the Safeguards Agreement under the JCPOA. Modified Code 3.1, which pertains to the early declaration of nuclear facilities, does not constitute a safeguards obligation, and the IAEA’s continued invocation of it as such does not confer any legitimacy thereon.
Sixth, the report further alleges that “in recent years, Iran has implemented de-designations of experienced inspectors in a manner that undermines the Agency’s ability to implement safeguards effectively and efficiently.” It must be noted, however, that pursuant to the IAEA’s report on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in 2024, as of 31 December 2024, a total of 274 inspectors were employed in Iran’s operational divisions and the verification office, with 120 of those inspectors specifically stationed in the Iran verification office. That the Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to the political action of the three European states in the Board of Governors, revoked the designation of certain inspectors of those nationalities must not be interpreted as an impairment of the IAEA’s capacity or capability in Iran. It is self-evident that Iran cannot reasonably be expected to place full confidence in inspectors holding the nationality of such states, and the withdrawal of their designation constitutes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sovereign right under the Safeguards Agreement. It is indeed regrettable that Mr. Grossi ignores the presence and work of 120 inspectors of various nationalities operating in Iran and reduces the entirety of the IAEA’s capability to a mere handful of inspectors from three European states.
Seventh, all of the foregoing stands in stark contrast to the fact that this very report states: “Iran continues to cooperate with the Agency on routine safeguards matters, and the Agency is undertaking extensive verification efforts in the country in line with its nuclear fuel cycle and related activities.” Moreover, the 2024 Safeguards Implementation Report notes:
“Based on the evaluation conducted, the Secretariat has concluded that the declared nuclear material in 31 States, including Iran, remained in peaceful activities.”
That same report also contains several noteworthy figures. For instance, it indicates that among the 32 countries that have concluded safeguards agreements without Additional Protocols in force—of which Iran is one—21 out of 100 safeguarded nuclear facilities are located in Iran. Of the 682 inspections conducted among this group of states, 493 were carried out in Iran alone. Out of 224 design information verifications, 144 were conducted solely in Iran. Of the total 1,895 inspector-days across this group, 1,260 were expended in Iran alone. Furthermore, the report states that €22,626,000 of the Agency’s regular €38,905,000 budget for 2024 was spent exclusively in Iran. Additionally, €4,300,000 of the Agency’s €28,000,000 in extrabudgetary or voluntary contributions were also allocated to activities in Iran.
What does such an extensive volume of the Agency’s activities in Iran signify, if not Iran’s constructive and comprehensive cooperation with the IAEA? That the Agency has found no diversion and no irregularity whatsoever with respect to the ongoing safeguards concerning Iran’s nuclear materials and activities, yet has directed its focus toward previously closed matters—what does this indicate, if not a politically motivated act carried out under the pressure of certain states?
Eighth, throughout the history of the IAEA, numerous instances of politicization and political manipulation have been observed within this international body. The deafening silence of Western countries, the United States, and Agency officials in the face of the Zionist Israeli regime exemplifies this politicization. On the other hand, we have previously witnessed that, in the case of two Member States of the Agency and the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had conducted undeclared enrichment activities, their files were closed in the Board of Governors without any consequential action whatsoever. Why, then, are the IAEA and certain states seeking to fabricate a contrived dossier against the Islamic Republic of Iran by reviving unsubstantiated and, indeed, closed allegations? The judgment lies indeed with the court of public opinion.
Ninth, and finally, let it be stated unequivocally: the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither pursuing nuclear weapons nor does it possess any undeclared nuclear materials or activities. Iran has hitherto remained committed to all of its obligations. The cost that Iran has borne has been for the sake of preserving its dignity, honor, progress, and steadfastness in the face of coercion and the hegemonic ambitions of certain powers. Should these states choose to abuse Iran’s patience and persist in their erroneous path, Iran will be compelled—commensurate with the evolving circumstances and actions of the other parties—to adopt and implement appropriate decisions, the responsibility, consequences, and ramifications of which shall rest entirely with those states.
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