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Enrichment flip-flop

Can you imagine anything worse than having to negotiate with Donald Trump? Yes, perhaps negotiating with Vladimir Putin is as bad or worse.
 
Axios and Reuters have done great investigative reporting on the U.S.-Iran negotiations. Here is my understanding on where things stand today. 

Iran’s position. Reuters reported that "Iran's nuclear negotiations committee", under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, found the U.S. proposal was "completely one-sided" and could not serve Tehran's interests. 

Sanctions relief is Iran’s priority and, as Axios reported, the U.S. side had so far not provided sufficient assurances in terms of when and how sanctions would be lifted. 

Second priority is avoiding a military attack. Third priority is avoiding UN Security Council “snapback” sanctions. Keeping the talks with the U.S. going and not being the one saying “no” is Iran’s route for success with those two priorities. 

Iran hopes that the way forward with Trump can be first a "political deal" that could lead to a broader nuclear accord. [Reuters] We can wish them success. 

U.S. position. Sanctions relief will be granted only after Iran "demonstrates real commitment" to the satisfaction of the U.S. and IAEA. [Axios] Witkoff no doubt tries to downplay sanctions relief in public statements, and by now has understood that it will be a major bone of contention in political acceptance of a deal in Washington. Trump will have to give sanctions relief the backing of an Executive Order or equivalent that the Republicans have to accept (and the Israel lobby will grind their teeth over). 

The nuclear deal will focus on creating a regional enrichment consortium, while accepting limited uranium enrichment in Iran (limitations still have to be negotiated). [ Axios] This consortium idea came up in the early stages of getting to JCPOA, but was dropped. The many political, financial and technical obstacles make it almost as fanciful as Trump’s Gaza Riviera. If it remains in discussion, I will devote a blog to it. 

Necessary will be a "strong system for monitoring and verification" including immediate approval of the IAEA's additional protocol. [Axios] Hopefully the U.S. will accept that IAEA, acting under the NPT, is the sole verification organization in Iran. And hopefully, Iran’s implementation of its Additional Protocol will be part of it fully accepting the current NPT safeguards norm. 

Israel’s position. The Netanyahu cabinet wants war. And they much prefer a joint U.S.-Israel war on Iran, but they are likely to go it alone if their supporters in Washington tell them they have Donald Trump’s ear and thus will get supporting U.S. military actions. 

So, whether we have another endless war in the Middle East will depend on who is the last one to whisper in Donald Trump’s ear. His posting yesterday indicates that Israel had the lead, but that was yesterday. Let’s hope he ends up supporting no more U.S. wars in the Middle East.

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