“Serious concern”

 

This photo of IAEA Director General Grossi accompanied an article in The San Diego Union Tribune on June 1 reporting on two reports he has submitted for the IAEA board meeting beginning on June 9. He is getting the visibility that he desires, as he looks to campaigning to become UN Secretary General.

As Francois Murphy of Reuters reported on May 30 and 31, one IAEA report is a "comprehensive" account of issues including Iran's cooperation, as requested by an IAEA Board resolution in November 2024. As BBC and Reuters reported, the findings in that report pave the way for the US, Britain, France and Germany to push for the IAEA's board of governors to find Iran in violation of its non-proliferation obligations, for the first time in almost 20 years, a move bound to enrage Tehran. Diplomats told Reuters that it had not yet been determined at what point the Western powers would seek to have the matter referred to the Security Council, and it is unclear what action if any the Security Council would then take against Iran. 

The second is the quarterly report on IAEA’s actions under the JCPOA. It states that Iran has produced 60%-enriched uranium at a rate equivalent to roughly one nuclear weapon per month over the past three months, increasing its inventory of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 by roughly half to 408.6 kg. That is enough, if enriched further, for nine nuclear weapons, according to an IAEA yardstick. 

It was about this second report that DG Grossi said: "The significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran... is of serious concern." 

Are these developments going in the right direction toward resolving the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program? I am concerned that they are not. Here is my reasoning. 

As explained in my May 28 posting, two things are needed to resolve the Iran nuclear issue, and the two reports address them. (The details will be checked once the Board derestricts the reports during its upcoming meeting.) 

First, Iran needs to fully meet its NPT obligations, so that IAEA can provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear material remains in peaceful use. We shall see how this IAEA report presents what Iran needs to do. Certainly, one important action would be to permanently implement its Additional Protocol. And there are other necessary actions by Iran. 

Will a Board finding that Iran is in noncompliance with its NPT obligations result in Iran taking those actions? Earlier Board resolutions, which were short of declaring noncompliance, have not had that result. One can expect that this new Board resolution will give Iran some time to “mend its ways” with the threat of passing the matter back to the UN Security Council. That process was used in 2005 and led to referral to the Security Council in 2006. From there, it took numerous Security Council resolutions and until 2015 to arrive at agreement on JCPOA. That history is not very encouraging. I will address how I would prefer to see Iran’s NPT compliance situation addressed after we learn what the IAEA Board does at their June 9-13 meeting. 

Second, States are in agreement that, one way or another, they want Iran to be moved back away from being a “threshold” nuclear State. JCPOA did that, until Trump undermined JCPOA. The new agreement that Steve Witkoff is negotiating with Iran could do it again. I wish him success. Let’s see how that plays out, whether the doves or the hawks in Washington have the most influence on Donald Trump. 

Israel won’t accept an agreement that includes continued uranium enrichment in Iran. Israel wants to use military action to set Iran’s nuclear program back, as they did in Iraq and in Syria. And Netanyahu is counting on U.S. support for Israel’s military action, which they had scheduled for May 2025 but have postponed at least a bit. 

But, thanks to Trump’s 2018 action, the situation “on the ground” has changed. Iran has been able to move ahead with uranium enrichment so that they now have, according to IAEA’s new report, lots of 60% U-235 hexafluoride in transportable cylinders that they will move to safety, along with advanced centrifuges, if Israel proceeds to an attack. And then Iran would be able to “threaten” that they will move to weaponization unless, e.g., they get substantial sanctions relief from the U.S. That would be high stakes play and could result in a major Middle East war. That outcome would again depend on the doves and hawks in Washington and what Donald Trump decides to do. Which is just the way he loves it! 

Yes, Director General Grossi, we can concur with your “serious concern.”