The reader of UN Security Council resolution UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) may note and wonder about the phrase “the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.” That phrase appears 10 times in the body of UNSC/RES/2231 [para 6; Annex B, paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e)] and 4 times in the annexed JCPOA [paras 20, 23, 34iv; Annex 5, para 19]. In this blog, I will answer the questions: what does it mean, who wanted the phrase, and why did they want it. This story is relevant to an important current issue - Iran’s Additional Protocol.
What does “Broader Conclusion” mean? The history of this phrase is interesting. Up to the Iraq debacle, the IAEA drew an annual safeguards conclusion that the declared nuclear material in a state remained in peaceful activities. Now, in carrying out its obligations under an NPT safeguards agreement, IAEA did look for possible undeclared nuclear material or activities but with limited means. Therefore, IAEA did not draw a conclusion that there were no undeclared nuclear activities going on in the state.
After Iraq, States agreed with Director General Hans Blix that IAEA needed more information and more access regarding detection of undeclared nuclear material or activities. As a first step, States agreed on new measures that IAEA could use within its legal mandate. Most important of these were environmental monitoring and use of satellite imagery. But, to provide IAEA that greater information and access, new legal authority was needed. With that objective, the Board of Governors and the IAEA Secretariat negotiated the Additional Protocol (AP) to safeguards agreements - applicable to all agreement types, NPT comprehensive safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153), item specific safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/66) and Voluntary Offer Agreements with the nuclear weapon states. The result of the extended negotiation was INFCIRC/540, the AP. And States immediately began to voluntarily add the AP to their safeguards agreement and to implement it. Today IAEA implements safeguards in 142 States with an AP. For the NPT non-nuclear weapon States, that means IAEA safeguards is implemented under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP). And that has become the NPT safeguards norm for NPT non-nuclear weapon States.
Under that norm, IAEA is now drawing the safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material in a State remains in peaceful activities. That includes a finding of no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. One can imagine that in moving from ‘declared nuclear material’ to ‘all nuclear material’, the question was raised what to call this safeguards conclusion. Perhaps a clever diplomat (or maybe IAEA staff member) said one day, “Let’s call it a Broader Conclusion.” In any case, that term was adopted.
Who wanted the phrase about the Broader Conclusion? Among the negotiators and then parties to JCPOA, the phrase has no direct relevance for the NPT nuclear weapon states, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States. And it has no direct relevance to the European Union (EU) through its verification organization, EURATOM. Then there is Germany. While the phrase does have direct relevance, it is hard to see why Germany would have wanted it included. That leaves Iran. I think there can be little doubt that it was Iran who pushed to have the phrase included, and it may well have had to overcome opposition from other parties.
Why did Iran want the phrase included? Now we get to the real meat of this story. In drafting the JCPOA and UNSC/RES/2231, Annex B, the starting and end point of various provisions had to be specified. Regarding the end points, periods of so many years were negotiated for specific provisions, ranging from 5 to 8 to 10. Iran must have presented its case for an earlier end point under a particular condition. And that condition was that a Broader Conclusion had been drawn by IAEA for Iran.
That means that the responsible Iranians were thinking that Iran wanted to get that Broader Conclusion, as they were seeing a growing number of NPT States were. Because once there was a Broader Conclusion for a State, IAEA was reducing (somewhat) the intensity of its verification in the State. And those Iranians wanted to get to that benefit too.
So what? Well, as stated above, having an Additional Protocol in force was a requirement to get a Broader Conclusion. Responsible Iranians were expecting that Iran would have their Additional Protocol in force, implemented initially provisionally and then permanently under the JCPOA, and therefore Iran would be eligible for a Broader Conclusion.
Unfortunately, the United States under President Donald Trump blew all that up by withdrawing from JCPOA. In response, Iran stepwise stopped implementing its JCPOA obligations, including its provisional implementation of its AP.
Conclusion. The question that should be posed to Iran today is: why don’t you put your AP in force permanently, as 142 other States have done? Why don’t you join the NPT States in meeting the current NPT safeguards norm?
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