The Objective of NPT safeguards carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown…” [INFCIRC/153, para 28]. Compare that with the Basic Undertaking of safeguards: “for the exclusive purpose of verifying that [nuclear] material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” [INFCIRC/153, para 1]. Our colleague Myron Kratzer, who had a lead position in developing INFCIRC/153, would be smiling now; he enjoyed explaining why he pushed for and got the addition of “purposes unknown” in paragraph 28.
What does that mean? It means that the IAEA inspectors have only to detect that nuclear material that should be there is not there. They do not have to know for what purpose it was taken or where it is to declare that diversion has taken place and report that to the IAEA Director General: “The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors.” [IAEA Statute, Article XII.C]
On June 19 Senior IRGC General Mohsen Rezaei posted: "All enriched materials have been transferred (before Israel's strikes) and are in secure locations. We will come out of this war with our hands full."
Such action by Iran was predicted by numerous commentators. Doesn’t that sound like diversion for purposes unknown? Now the ‘ball is in the IAEA court’. But, on instruction of the Director General, IAEA inspections have stopped for the safety of inspectors. What to do?
On June 20, IAEA Director General Grossi made a statement to the UN Security Council about the situation in Iran (for the second time). Following 16 paragraphs about radiology and nuclear safety, he addressed safeguards:
The Agency is… and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume … as soon as safety and security conditions allow… [B]ased on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities…, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards....[M]ore than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted... it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for.”
Will the DG’s demands addressed to the UN Security Council result in action? Perhaps. I have another idea.
My recommendation is that the Director General should announce that he will send inspectors to Fordow on such and such day at such and such time, and request that Israel and the U.S. do not attack Fordow during the period the inspectors are there. Assuming Iran agrees, the inspectors will visit Fordow and determine whether the UF6 cylinders that were there have been moved or not. If they find diversion “for purposes unknown” has taken place, the inspectors will report that to the DG, who will transmit their report to the IAEA Board of Governors. If Iran refuses to allow inspectors to inspect Fordow, then the DG would report that as non-compliance to the IAEA Board of Governors.
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