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Is Trump’s Special Military Operation over?

Too late. My suggestion yesterday for IAEA inspector action to determine whether the enriched uranium had been moved from Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan is no go after Trump’s Special Military Operation. Whether or not the three sites are totally destroyed, as Trump proclaimed, the near-term return of inspectors to those sites is not likely. 
 
So, what’s next in the nuclear area? The Institute for the Study of War, an American nonprofit based in Washington, started their Iran Update Special Report on June 20, 2025, with this: 

         Iran is attempting to impose a dilemma on the United States and the international community: accept Iranian terms in nuclear negotiations or risk a long and challenging hunt for hidden Iranian nuclear material. Iranian officials posted that they had relocated their enriched material to a secure location, suggesting that destroying it would require a long, challenging, and possibly futile hunt for hidden material and that, therefore, the West should negotiate with Iran. 

Recall that after the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution on June 13 finding Iran in noncompliance with its NPT obligations, Iran announced in response that it would open a new underground enrichment facility. Presumably that is what Iran has been digging in a mountain next to the Natanz facility for over a year. But they may have other underground locations to which they have moved some of the enriched uranium (Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.). 
 
In Iran’s first statement about the American attack, they specifically called out the IAEA, saying it was complicit with the Western powers who are acting against Iran. Why did Iran put that up front? My thought is that they know that as an NPT member they have the obligation to inform IAEA of where all nuclear material is and when it is moved. They have just moved nuclear material into hiding and, you can bet, they do not intend to tell IAEA where it is for an obvious reason. That means Iran will be in noncompliance with NPT safeguards obligations. As written in my June 21 post, the IAEA Director General should inform the Board, which should find Iran in noncompliance (again) and send a report to the UN Security Council. Iran is building its defense for an IAEA Board discussion, with the hope that many States, especially in the Global South, will side with Iran in opposition to the U.S. Special Military Action. 

Regarding Iran’s military response to the Special Military Operation, I imagine Iran will hold off briefly to see how opposition to a new war grows in Congress, with the Washington elite and with the American public. If opposition doesn’t swell, expect attacks on U.S. military in the region. 

So now we shall see whether Trump will proceed to turn this into a Middle East war, or if this will be another “TACO” event.

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