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Four Days in June, June 12-15, 2025

These have been quite some four days. Much to digest and many open questions. Here are some highlights and reactions. 

IAEA Board Iran Resolution On Thursday, June 13, the E3 (France, Germany, U.K.) pushed their resolution on Iran through the IAEA Board of Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, which will lead to a report to the UN Security Council where further action can take place. That’s the way things looked on Thursday. 

6th Round of U.S.-Iran Talks The 6th round of U.S. (Witkoff)-Iran talks was first announced for Thursday, then moved to Sunday, June 15, in Oman. There seemed to be a stalemate on enrichment in Iran. On Saturday, Oman announced that the talks had been cancelled., while President Trump publicly encouraged Iran to resume the talks to reach agreement that Iran would give up uranium enrichment. That is U.S. negotiation tactics in the Trump era. 

Israel Netanyahu had threatened to attack Iran. It was reported that Trump told him to hold off to see what the 6th round would bring. Netanyahu went ahead with a massive attack on Iran, focusing on assassinations of Iranian leadership. Attacked initially were also nuclear sites and air defense systems. Iran responded with missiles on Israel. By Sunday, June 15, Israel was attacking Iranian oil and gas facilities and civilian targets, Iran was responding, and the war was spreading. Reports were 78 killed in Iran, 4-6 killed in Israel, and lots of wounded in both countries. 

IAEA inspectors IAEA Director General Grossi, in a statement to the UN Security Council, reported that IAEA inspectors had been safely withdrawn. That seems to mean that IAEA inspection in Iran is paused.

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