What a range of Iran safeguards related topics Director General Grossi addressed today, in his Opening Statement to the IAEA BOG meeting, a press conference, and a reported interview.
Opening Statement.
• “I call upon Iran urgently to cooperate fully and effectively with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” That is a diplomatic way of saying that Iran is not fully and effectively cooperating as required by Paragraph 3 of its NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA.
• “Iran’s unilateral decision to stop implementation of modified Code 3.1 has led to a significant reduction in the Agency’s ability to verify whether Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful.” That is stretching things a bit. The information provided under Code 3.1 is not a direct sign of whether or not a nuclear program is peaceful. The reason that Code 3.1 was modified was to give IAEA more time to prepare to implement safeguards in a new facility. For Iran, it seems that the IAEA wants early notification of a new facility where enrichment (and possibly other steps in centrifuge manufacture) would be done. But, as soon as Iran informed IAEA, Israel would put the new facility on its “to bomb” list. So, Iran should agree to modify Code 3.1, but perhaps its reasons for delaying doing that are understandable.
• “I also encourage States that have not yet concluded additional protocols to do so as soon as possible.” That standard sentence occurs, as usual, in the paragraph on new safeguards agreements. I wanted to see in the Iran section the language used for modified Code 3.1: “Iran’s unilateral decision to stop implementation of its Additional Protocol has led to a significant reduction in the Agency’s ability to verify whether Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful.” Even better would have been this language: With Iran’s decision not to meet the current NPT safeguards norm by implementing its CSA and Additional Protocol including modified Code 3.1, the Agency will not draw a safeguards conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
• “[T]he Agency cannot ignore the stockpiling of over 400 kg of highly enriched uranium.” “The rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium … is of serious concern.” Again, the DG’s diplomatic language, that may get him accused of exceeding his mandate. Of course, IAEA does not “ignore” the highly enriched uranium; it verifies all of Iran’s declared uranium. It would be of “serious concern” to IAEA if there were problems with carrying out that verification (that would be termed an anomaly). OK, all of us involved with nonproliferation are not happy that Iran is accumulating that uranium, call it “concerned” if you will. But not the IAEA, which includes, the Secretariat (Department of Safeguards), Director General, the Board of Governors, the General Conference and all IAEA members.
Press conference on May 31 report about Iran obtaining IAEA documents
Reuters reported that a May 31 report states that “IAEA has conclusive evidence of highly confidential documents belonging to the Agency having been actively collected and analyzed by Iran." Grossi said in a press conference that "Here, unfortunately, and this dates to a few years ago ... we could determine with all clarity that documents that belong to the agency were in the hands of Iranian authorities, which is bad." "We believe that an action like this is not compatible with the spirit of cooperation." The reason for issuing this report now, as it is said to be about events “a few years ago” is a mystery. Is it an indication that the DG supports a Board resolution that Iran is in noncompliance with its NPT obligations? In any case, it is another item on the Iran case list.
Reported Grossi interview, Jerusalem Post, published June 9, 2025
Rafael Grossi said Iranians warned him that “A strike [by Israel on Iran] could potentially have an amalgamating effect, solidifying Iran’s determination – I will say it plainly – to pursue a nuclear weapon or withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Perhaps he added, but it was not reported, that IAEA inspectors must not be at the locations that Israel strikes, and he requires from Israel adequate advanced notice to allow the inspectors to withdraw from Iran, and if Israel does not give that assurance then he must consider interrupting inspections in Iran to assure the safety of his inspectors.
Comments
Post a Comment