In a June 26, 2025, Foreign Affairs article titled “Did the Attacks on Iran Succeed?” Richard Nephew lays out his updated assessment of the situation in and prospects for Iran. He ends with “Whatever comes next, the world is entering a very uncertain and dangerous phase when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program.” Here are reactions to some key points he makes.
Iran’s Arak reactor was destroyed and, with it, any near-term chance that Iran could produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Under JCPOA, the Arak research reactor was being redesigned to not be a producer of good plutonium for weapons use. China had the lead in the project. After Trump withdrew from JCPOA, work continued on the redesign and construction, but some information indicated that Iran was maintaining the option to return to the original design. The full situation is unclear to me. Israel decided to bomb the partially constructed research reactor, it’s third such attack on research reactors in construction (also in Iraq and Syria). It can be argued that it wasn’t or that it was necessary. In any case, Iran’s peaceful nuclear program won’t be able to use that research reactor. A further point on Nephew’s “near-term.” The plutonium route was never going to be available in less that 5-10 years, so Israel was thinking long-term with this bombing.
The biggest issue is whether Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium still exists and is accessible.
Iran will now have an opportunity during recovery operations to divert some of the equipment and material that was once under IAEA monitoring while claiming it was destroyed in the attacks.
Nephew hits a key point: whether IAEA inspectors will be given any access to the bombed facilities and how much information Iran will give IAEA on the inventories of enriched uranium after the bombings. Under Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement, it should provide full information. If it doesn’t, it will be in noncompliance with its NPT obligations.
In 2021, Tehran … stopped providing public information about just how many [centrifuges] it was making.
A couple points to clarify here. Under the NPT, States provide information to IAEA only on their nuclear material (and nuclear facilities where that material is). They do not provide any information on acquiring or producing nuclear equipment, including centrifuges. That was uniquely under the JCPOA that Trump said was the worst agreement ever made. Iran never provided “public” information about its centrifuges. Under JCPOA, Iran provided information to IAEA about centrifuges. The IAEA Secretariat provided information to the IAEA Board of Governors in confidential reports. The Board of Governors decided to make those reports available to the public.
[IAEA] inspectors were able to provide some confidence to other countries that Iran had not produced nuclear weapons.
The level of confidence that IAEA can provide that an NPT State’s nuclear material remains in peaceful use depends on the safeguards agreement voluntarily entered into by the State. Over time, an NPT safeguards norm has developed, now accepted by and implemented in more that 140 States. The norm is a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) including modified Code 3.1 (early design information) and an Additional Protocol (AP). Iran is one of a small number of States that has not accepted this norm, neither modified Code 3.1 or the AP. Therefore, the level of confidence that IAEA can provide on Iran is less than it is for most all other NPT States. Nevertheless, the level of confidence IAEA can provide on Iran with just the CSA in force is substantial.
Iran’s parliament… just passed legislation that will greatly reduce its cooperation with the IAEA. IAEA may lose its access to the country.
Tehran can withdraw from the [NPT], and it now might. If so, it can make a compelling argument for why it did so.
If Iran decides it is necessary to take the crucial step of withdrawing from NPT because of the actions taken and threatened to be taken by the U.S. and Israel, it will be a major failure of U.S. statecraft. Yes, Iran can use the same “compelling argument” that North Korea did for withdrawing - U.S. threatened actions.
If Iran decides not to move toward nuclear weapons right now, it will almost certainly reconstruct its program in more protected spaces, away from the prying eyes of the IAEA.
Nephew is here indicating that he can foresee Iran carrying out a clandestine nuclear weapon program while remaining an NPT member with IAEA inspections. That suggests a failure of IAEA to detect that clandestine program. If Iran continues to not put its Additional Protocol in force and implement it, it might succeed. Once again, priority should be given by NPT States to get Iran to implement its AP.
Military action may have ultimately been necessary to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.
Here, I must beg to differ. It was very clear that Iran was ready to again sign up to a “Trump” deal that would have restricted its nuclear program comparably, or a little more, than JCPOA. Trump didn’t do that. Yes, Trump gets the blame. Trump bowed to the Netanyahu hawks that would settle for nothing less than “obliteration.” So, Nephew concludes that “the world is entering a very uncertain and dangerous phase.”
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