Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute has moved the Iran nuclear conundrum into the great power geopolitical sphere. Or rather he is downgrading it’s importance relative to the European need for U.S. commitment and support in the struggle with Russia. He has posted on his Substack and on the Quincy Responsible Statecraft website Europe uses Iran as pawn in transatlantic power play on September 19.            His analysis is a bit complex or better convoluted. The E3 activated the UNSC ‘ snapback ’ mechanism (on August 28) for two principal reasons: punish Iran for its assistance to Russia in the Ukraine war; and curry favor with the Trump administration for staying with Europe in opposing Russia. The fact that it is about nuclear is just convenient.            Parsi also projects that Israel will ‘ finish the job ’ with military action against Iran perhaps at the end of this month (when ‘ snapback ’ goes into force) or...

To judge how governments are viewing the Iran conundrum, here are excerpts from 13 national statements ( available in English on IAEA website ) at the IAEA General Conference, September 15-19, on Iran. The majority of states did not mention Iran, including Brazil, India, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey. Mentions of ‘diplomacy’ are highlighted.  Australia       We remain deeply concerned by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s failure to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in a full and technically credible manner. It has produced and accumulated a growing stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% - for which there is no credible civilian justification. The Agency’s current lack of access to verify the location of this material is alarming. It is essential that Iran promptly resume implementation of, and full compliance with, its legally binding safeguards obligations. Australia notes the Director General’s 9 September announcement with Iran on practical steps to re...

More bad news on the ‘ snapback ’ sanctions front with a No vote in the UN Security Council today on the ROK Chair’s resolution to permanently end UNSC Iran sanctions. But there is a week more to September 27-28 for further action in this complex matter. We will stay tuned. For today, here are developments in advance of that UNSC vote.            On September 18 the Wall Street Journal reported that ‘ Iran made a new offer to E3 yesterday to avoid snapback…The E3 regard Iran's latest proposal as insufficient in substance … without any concrete actions on the Iranian side'.  Iran International reported that on September 18 French President Emmanuel Macron in an interview with Israel’s Channel 12 asked if the return of UN sanctions on Iran was a ‘ done deal ’ responded, “ Yes, I think so. Because the latest news we have from the Iranians are not serious ."            One of the E3 requirements is U.S.-Iran talks un...

The news about the Iran conundrum is anything but encouraging. One could hope for positive signs. But here are highlights from Reuters, Newsweek and Al Jazeera.                 Iranian and E3 foreign ministers made little progress in a September 17 telephone call aimed at averting ' snapback ’ sanctions on Tehran being reimposed at the end of September. Germany's foreign ministry spokesperson said on X that the E3 had " underscored that Iran has yet to take the reasonable and precise actions necessary to reach an extension of resolution 2231 ", adding that sanctions would be reimposed " absent concrete actions in the coming days ".  [ An interesting point is that Germany is not in the UN Security Council and E3 action must be taken by France or the UK .]                The U.S. issued on September 16 a new wave of sanctions against Iran. The Treasury Department said the measures focused o...

Today, we will just try to digest the grim picture that Iran International   has posted in the past two days, including the title, More Iran-Israel confrontations inevitable , and the following.            US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on September 15 pledged unity and opposition to Iran and blessed a European initiative to restore United Nations sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear activities. Rubio said he supported the European initiative "100%."  Rubio said if the Islamic Republic does not "change course," the administration will continue to apply "maximum pressure" sanctions .            Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said at the Iran-Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) conference on September 16 that possible negotiations with the United States will hinge on Washington’s readiness for a deal based on mutual interests without th...

‘ If it wasn’t already clear enough, I will restate the United States’ position on Ira n.’ So says the U.S. National Statement at the 2025 IAEA General Conference, given today by US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, who presented himself as a lifelong energy entrepreneur. That statement said the following about the Iran nuclear conundrum, in the 14th of the 16 paragraphs.            Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway, including all enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, must be completely dismantled. Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA, abide by its safeguards obligations, and provide the IAEA with unhindered access to all sites of concern. Then, and only then, we would look forward to working with Iran to rejoin the world in global trade, bringing opportunity and prosperity to the Iranian people.            So that is the U.S. position on Iran, halfway through the 30-day ‘ snapback ’ mechanism period. Missing is a...

This post follows up yesterday’s posting on the outcome of the snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council. Looking at the requirement to vote on a resolution within 30 days (September 26), here are thoughts on how the voting will go. In the UN Security Council, nine (9) votes are required to pass a resolution; the five permanent members have a veto.  Votes that may be taken by UNSC   1. Resolution to extend RES/2231 with no snapback mechanism for 6 months [Russia, China]  2. Resolution to extend RES/2231 with snapback mechanism for 6 months [E3]  3. Resolution to make permanent the termination of UNSC sanctions under RES/2231 [UNSC Chair, ROK]  Snapback Sanctions Voting (projected ) 2025 Members                                                       For           ...

Halfway through the 30-day period of the RES/2231 snapback mechanism, activated by the E3 in the UN Security Council on August 28, let’s think about the outcome, or rather about the possible outcomes. Here are four. What would the players do? Iran has been transparent about what it would do in those cases. From my personal experience, I can predict what IAEA would do. Israel has been pretty clear also. But what the U.S. would do is ‘unpredictable’. More about that at the end.  A. Snapback of UNSC sanctions after 30 days   Iran : Stop negotiations with E3. Stop cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites. Threaten to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S. Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines.  U.S. : ?  IAEA : Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, as permitted by Iran. Report Iran’s failures to meet its NPT obligations to Board of Governo...

Perhaps IAEA inspectors are (or will be) walking around the outsides of the damaged sites of Fordow, Esfahan and Natanz. If so, it is a nice gesture of cooperation by Iran, while it won’t provide anything much regarding the status of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles. On that matter, today’s reports in the Israeli press are a bit conflicting. But they provide other useful information about what is going on and about the September 9 Cairo agreement between Iran and IAEA. Here are highlights.            The Jerusalem Post reported on Sept 11, 2025, based on reports by AFP, that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said during a television interview on September 11: “ All of our material is under the rubble of the bombed facilities " and it has now become inaccessible. Araghchi added that the IAEA was currently examining the sites.            But The Times of Israel on Sept 12, 2025, reported that in the televised ...

Today, September 10, brought media reports of reactions to the Cairo Iran-IAEA agreement on September 9. The AP and Reuters tried their best to digest the technical matters, while The Jerusalem Post spun it, as could be expected. Here are highlights from those reports.                 Stephanie Liechtenstein of AP reported quotes from Director General Grossi’s statement on Wednesday, September 10, to the ongoing IAEA Board of Governors meeting: ‘ An agreement between Tehran and the United Nations' atomic watchdog will provide the U.N. agency access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities and require Iran to report on the whereabouts of material that was at sites attacked by Israel earlier this year. [T]the document “provides for a clear understanding for the procedures of inspection notifications and their implementation.” The agreement “includes all facilities and installations in Iran and it also contemplates the required reporting on all...

The IAEA has ‘r ecognized the current circumstances ’ and found a way to proceed with Iran under its NPT safeguards agreement, signing a ‘ framework agreement ’ today in Cairo. IAEA DG Grossi said the following in his opening statement for the IAEA Board of Governors on Monday, September 8.            The Agency’s safeguards measures continue to apply in Iran as in every other country with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)..I recognise the current circumstances and have expressed the Agency’s readiness to consider Iran’s concerns and suggestions insofar as these would be compatible with the CSA.            We have [held] technical discussions in Tehran and in Vienna aimed at reaching agreement on the practical steps that will be applied to conduct verification activities in Iran pursuant to the CSA…It is my sincere hope that within the next few days it will be possible to come to a successful conclusion of ...

The spotlight will move to Vienna and the IAEA as its Board of Governors meets next week and the annual General Conference (GC) the following week. How will the Board follow up its June resolution of noncompliance by Iran? And how will the GC respond to the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities by Israel and the U.S. and the current safeguards situation there?  Helpful context is provided by two media reports today.  • Francois Murphy of Reuters reported on September 3 that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed in an interview that IAEA has had no information from Iran on the status or whereabouts of its stock of high enriched uranium since Israel launched its attacks on June 13. Grossi said Iran has brought up the importance of keeping the location of its enriched uranium secret, given the threats by Netanyahu and the Trump administration to bomb again at any time. Normally IAEA does let over a month pass without verifying the status of high enriched uranium. So far, r...

The initiation by the E3 of the 30-day snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council makes everything more difficult and there is great uncertainty about the outcome. Will it be peaceful with a new nuclear deal with Iran, negotiated by the U.S., endorsed by the UNSC and verified by IAEA, or will Iran withdraw from NPT with further military action by Israel and the U.S.?                 To perhaps shed a little light on what the outcome will be, here is my analysis of how the players - Iran, U.S. and E3 - may be assessing the acceptability of the range of outcomes. Four levels of acceptability were used: 1 Fully acceptable; 2 Less acceptable; 3 Just acceptable; and 4 Not acceptable. Four near term 30-day outcomes are listed, and two optimistic outcomes with an interim U.S.-Iran agreement reached within a 6-month extension.                 For the 30-day near term, the best outcome would b...

While waiting for news from the UNSC closed door meeting today on the E3 snapback mechanism initiation, it is instructive to note what the players involved have said to the media, which is probably similar to the positions taken in the meeting.  Russia  Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs : “ We strongly condemn these actions by European countries and call on the international community to reject them .”  Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s UN Ambassado r: The " move by E3 cannot and should not entail any legal or procedural effect. It's a mere escalatory step. Western countries…don't care about diplomacy, and they care only about, blackmail and, threats, and coercion of independent countries. The world is at a crossroads. It's quite clear. One option is peace, diplomacy and goodwill. Another option is…diplomacy at the barrel of the gun…extortion and blackmail .” " The United States abandoned JCPOA, and since then the situation started [to] deteriorate. We all know that t...

On August 28, 2025, Britain, France and Germany initiated in the UN Security Council a 30-day ‘snapback mechanism’ process that can restore UN sanctions on Iran that were modified under JCPOA in 2015. All U.N. sanctions on Iran would be reimposed in 30 days unless the Security Council takes other action. [ UNSC/RES/2231, paras 36, 37 ] Here is where matters stand on August 28, 2025.  At the request of the E3, the Security Council is to meet behind closed doors on August 29, 2025, to discuss the snapback move. [ Reuters ]  The UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting   within 30 days . [JCPOA, para 37]   What the applicable procedures are for that vote are not crystal clear.   Possible extension : Iran and the E3 have held several rounds of talks aiming to agree to defer the snapback mechanism.  Russia and China have circulated a draft resolution to the Security Council that wo...

          First, the good news: IAEA inspectors are back in Iran for inspection of nuclear facilities that were not attacked in the 12-day war in June. It is reported that IAEA inspectors will perform inspection during refuelling at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.            Second, the OK news: the E3 and Iran met again, in Geneva on Aug 26, for further discussion of the E3 threat to activate ‘ snapback ’ sanctions under UNSC/RES/2231, with the result being agreeing to meet again.            Third, the exciting news: Iran International reported that Russia and China have played a diplomatic card, circulating to the UN Security Council members a draft resolution calling for a six-month technical extension of UNSC/RES/2231 to April 18, 2026, with the possibility of further extensions, while urging all original participants to resume negotiations immediately.       ...

With the approach of the E3’s end-of-August deadline, the September 10-19 IAEA Board of Governors meeting and General Conference and the October 18 termination of UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) and JCPOA , hopefully there is thinking about how to make progress on the Iran nuclear case without causing a crisis. The worst-case outcome would be notice by Iran of its withdrawal from the NPT.  I was pleased to see my old colleagues Mark Goodman and Mark Fitzpatrick capably address “ What if Iran withdraws from the NPT ?” in the June 25 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Here are several points they made and my thoughts. Israel’s war of choice is likely to have the … effect of speeding up a step off the cliff.  On June 16, the foreign ministry spokesperson announced that Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, was preparing a bill that would withdraw Iran from the NPT.            Yes, the possibility of Iran’s NPT withdrawal should be taken seriously.  If Iran were ...

Hugh Chalmers of VERTIC wrote in the Bulleting of Atomic Scientists on August 12 about reestablishing IAEA safeguards in Iran after the June Israel/U.S. attacks. Two points are of particular interest.  1. Chalmers properly raises the importance of the 2025 IAEA General Conference on September 15-19 at which the Iran issue will be a topic. He writes the following:            IAEA member states differ on the legality of the military strikes and the IAEA’s statutory role and mandate to respond to them. These differences may be put on display at the September [IAEA General] Conference. If they are, member states will need to agree on some language that reinforces existing prohibitions and restrictions in this regard whilst retaining buy-in from Washington. A clear expression of restraint from member states—including from the United States—at the general conference could go some way to reassuring Iran that it will not be punished for complying with its...

Newsweek’s reporting on the potential effect of the UN Security Council ‘snapback’ sanctions had a significant difference between August 21 and 22.  Amir Daftari wrote on Aug 22: ‘ With the August 31 [E3] deadline approaching, Iran faces … the potential return of sweeping U.N. sanctions on its economy .’  That makes the snapback sound serious. But Amira El-Fekki wrote on August 21: ‘ The return of U.N. sanctions on Iran would include an arms embargo, missile and drone restrictions, bans on most nuclear activity, and travel, banking and asset freezes on designated Iranian entities and individuals .’  [Iranian Foreign Minister] Araghchi dismissed their effectiveness. " The economic sanctions of the Security Council are far more limited than the current unilateral U.S. sanctions. Things will not become any worse than the current situation. Yes, from a psychological and political, and even strategic point of view, there are consequences, but not to the extent that it would br...

With a week to go to the August 29 deadline set by the E3 (Britain, France, Germany) for when they will decide to try to activate the so-called “snapback” provision of UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) and JCPOA, the tempest is stirring the teapot.  ‘Hats off’ to Amira El-Fekki of Newsweek for her reporting on this. Here are some notable statements this week.  Abbas Araghchi , Iranian Foreign Minister: " [E3] think the snapback is the only tool they have. Here we have clearly explained our position: first, you have basically no right to use it as you, too, have effectively withdrawn from the deal following the U.S. withdrawal, and with your recent positions, including the zero enrichment. So you're no longer a participant in the JCPOA, and the right to snapback belongs only to remaining members. "  Mikhail Ulyanov , Russia's permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna: " The [E3] are themselves in violation of RES/2231 and the JCPOA. Therefore, legally s...