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Let’s hear a cheer for the IAEA!

The IAEA has ‘recognized the current circumstances’ and found a way to proceed with Iran under its NPT safeguards agreement, signing a ‘framework agreement’ today in Cairo. IAEA DG Grossi said the following in his opening statement for the IAEA Board of Governors on Monday, September 8. 
        The Agency’s safeguards measures continue to apply in Iran as in every other country with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)..I recognise the current circumstances and have expressed the Agency’s readiness to consider Iran’s concerns and suggestions insofar as these would be compatible with the CSA. 
        We have [held] technical discussions in Tehran and in Vienna aimed at reaching agreement on the practical steps that will be applied to conduct verification activities in Iran pursuant to the CSA…It is my sincere hope that within the next few days it will be possible to come to a successful conclusion of these discussions. 

        The next day, today, September 9, in Cairo, IAEA DG Rafael Grossi… met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi [with mediation] by Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel-Atti. Grossi posted on X that a framework agreement had been reached "on practical modalities to resume inspection activities in Iran." 
        [Araghchi] demanded "impartiality, independence and professionalism" from the IAEA. He emphasized that in the event of "hostile actions against Iran" — including the reimposition of sanctions — Iran would consider the agreement terminated. Germany, France and Britain have been threatening to reimpose UN sanctions unless Iran committed to serious negotiations on its nuclear programme. [Reuters] 

        This marks a significant step in the right direction. It is to be applauded. Hopefully it will be followed up by the E3 and the U.S.

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