Halfway through the 30-day period of the RES/2231 snapback mechanism, activated by the E3 in the UN Security Council on August 28, let’s think about the outcome, or rather about the possible outcomes. Here are four. What would the players do? Iran has been transparent about what it would do in those cases. From my personal experience, I can predict what IAEA would do. Israel has been pretty clear also. But what the U.S. would do is ‘unpredictable’. More about that at the end.
A. Snapback of UNSC sanctions after 30 days
Iran: Stop negotiations with E3. Stop cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites. Threaten to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S. Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines.
U.S.: ?
IAEA: Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, as permitted by Iran. Report Iran’s failures to meet its NPT obligations to Board of Governors, which will make finding that Iran is in noncompliance and report that to UN. Security Council for action.
Israel: Hold off on military attack.
B. No snapback of UNSC sanctions; RES/2231 (and JCPOA) terminate October 18.
Iran: Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines. Continue to slow-walk cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites. Threaten to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S.
U.S.: ?
IAEA: Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, including verification of uranium stockpiles if and as permitted by Iran. If cooperation is reasonable, do not report noncompliance to Board of Governors.
Israel: If and when there is intelligence on locations of uranium stockpiles, and enrichment infrastructure rebuilding, carry out military attack.
C. Extension of UNSC/RES/2231 for up to 6 months with possibility of snapback mechanism.
Iran: Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines. If E3 activates snapback mechanism during extension, stop negotiations with E3 and stop cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites. Threaten to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S.
U.S.: ?
IAEA: Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, including verification of uranium stockpiles if and as permitted by Iran. If cooperation is reasonable, do not report noncompliance to Board of Governors.
Israel: Unless there is intelligence on locations of uranium stockpiles, and enrichment infrastructure rebuilding, hold off on military attack for extension period
D. Extension of UNSC/RES/2231 for up to 6 months with no snapback mechanism.
Iran: Offer to negotiate with U.S. with enrichment and ballistic missiles as redlines. Threaten to stop cooperation with IAEA on inspections at bombed sites and to withdraw from NPT if further actions against it are taken, e.g., military attack by Israel and/or U.S.
U.S.: ?
IAEA: Maintain cooperation under NPT safeguards agreement, including verification of uranium stockpiles if and as permitted by Iran. If cooperation is reasonable, do not report noncompliance to Board of Governors.
Israel: Unless there is intelligence on locations of uranium stockpiles, and enrichment infrastructure rebuilding, hold off on military attack for extension period.
Will the U.S be ‘missing’ as it is being called on the Ukraine war, pressure on Russia, commitment to NATO, and the atrocious Gaza-West Bank war? Who knows? Experts with Middle East experience are calling for the U.S. to take the opportunity to negotiate a solid and lasting new deal with Iran. But I do not see that the Secretary of State/National Security Advisor and the President’s Special Envoy have what it would take to get that done. And the President? Unpredictable.
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