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U.S. restates its position on Iran

‘If it wasn’t already clear enough, I will restate the United States’ position on Iran.’ So says the U.S. National Statement at the 2025 IAEA General Conference, given today by US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, who presented himself as a lifelong energy entrepreneur. That statement said the following about the Iran nuclear conundrum, in the 14th of the 16 paragraphs. 
        Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway, including all enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, must be completely dismantled. Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA, abide by its safeguards obligations, and provide the IAEA with unhindered access to all sites of concern. Then, and only then, we would look forward to working with Iran to rejoin the world in global trade, bringing opportunity and prosperity to the Iranian people. 
        So that is the U.S. position on Iran, halfway through the 30-day ‘snapback’ mechanism period. Missing is any indication of whether or when the U.S. intends to talk with Iran. Restarting U.S.-Iran talks is one of the three conditions necessary for the E3 to step back from reactivating UNSC sanctions on September 27 and accept an extension of RES/2231 of up to 6 months, to give time for at least an interim deal to be worked out between Iran and the U.S. 
        Will the E3 conclude that the U.S. conditions as stated by Mr. Wright have no chance of being met, so Iran-U.S. talks would not succeed, and the E3 decides to play hardball and have UNSC sanctions ‘snapback’ in two weeks? 
        The well publicized results would be that Iran ends diplomatic contacts with the E3, stops working with IAEA on NPT verification procedures, and threatens to withdraw from NPT if it is attacked again by Israel and the U.S. And on October 18, UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) will terminate and JCPOA will also terminate. Mr. Trump would certainly tweet triumphantly about that! 
        Or will E3 decide to play softball instead, back off ‘snapback’ and support the 6-month extension? Can we count on the U.S. to play a determining role in the next two weeks? If so, what will it do? Unpredictable. Hopefully, Russia and China will step up to the plate and hit a home run.

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