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More Iran confrontations inevitable, Israeli defense official says

Today, we will just try to digest the grim picture that Iran International  has posted in the past two days, including the title, More Iran-Israel confrontations inevitable, and the following. 
        US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on September 15 pledged unity and opposition to Iran and blessed a European initiative to restore United Nations sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear activities. Rubio said he supported the European initiative "100%."  Rubio said if the Islamic Republic does not "change course," the administration will continue to apply "maximum pressure" sanctions
        Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said at the Iran-Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) conference on September 16 that possible negotiations with the United States will hinge on Washington’s readiness for a deal based on mutual interests without threats or intimidation. 

Does Rubio speak for Trump? Does Trump care what happens with Iran after he ‘obliterated’ its nuclear program? One thing is clear: the U.S. and Iran will not be talking by the ‘snapback’ cutoff date. So, the E3 are left hanging. One imagines they will have to swallow their pride and push for a UNSC resolution that extends RES/2231 with continued 'snapback' mechanism. What will the U.S. do? Netanyahu will be pushing hard on Trump (and Rubio) for the U.S. to veto any extension resolution. If I had to bet, it would be for another U.S. pro-Israel veto and ‘snapback’ sanctions. And then all hell may break loose.

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