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Showing posts from June, 2025

The Plot Thickens: Iran vs. IAEA DG Grossi

Tehran Times on June 27, 2025, wrote: ‘ Rafael Grossi’s disgracefulness, his sheer audacity, and his utter lack of genuine concern for the very laws he is entrusted to uphold surpass even the most egregious Western puppets who have come before him .’ ‘In a post on X, Iran’s former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called for Grossi's replacement at the IAEA. Zarif wrote: “ Having abetted the slaughter of innocents through his fictitious IAEA report, Rafael Grossi is now conspiring to abet more war crimes through his reckless musing that Iran is hiding uranium at World Heritage Sites in Isfahan. IAEA should rid itself of this disgrace. ”  Tehran Times on June 20 reported: ‘on [June 19] Mohammad Eslami, Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, formally notified Grossi of impending legal action for " inaction " over Israel’s " repeated barbaric attacks " on safeguarded nuclear sites. Eslami emphasized the IAEA Board operates under " the guidance, inf...

Richard Nephew’s Assessment as of June 26, 2025

In a June 26, 2025, Foreign Affairs article titled “ Did the Attacks on Iran Succeed ?” Richard Nephew lays out his updated assessment of the situation in and prospects for Iran. He ends with “ Whatever comes next, the world is entering a very uncertain and dangerous phase when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program .” Here are reactions to some key points he makes.                 Iran’s Arak reactor was destroyed and, with it, any near-term chance that Iran could produce weapons-grade plutonium.   Under JCPOA, the Arak research reactor was being redesigned to not be a producer of good plutonium for weapons use. China had the lead in the project. After Trump withdrew from JCPOA, work continued on the redesign and construction, but some information indicated that Iran was maintaining the option to return to the original design. The full situation is unclear to me. Israel decided to bomb the partially constructed research reactor, it’s ...

If Iran had its Additional Protocol in force

Everyone wants to know what the situation is at the nuclear facilities attacked by Israel and the U.S. Of primary interest is where the 60% and 20% enriched uranium cylinders are and whether some were destroyed and the material released to the environment. Of secondary interest is the status of the centrifuges, especially the advanced centrifuges at Fordow and at Natanz.  When will Iran submit revised information to IAEA on the nuclear materials at the bombed nuclear facilities? When will Iran permit IAEA inspectors to visit the bombed nuclear facilities? Do the inspection arrangements before military attack remain valid? The IAEA inspectorate must be interacting with Iran on such questions.  If Iran had its Additional Protocol (AP) in force, IAEA could request “ Complementary Access ,” the additional access provided by it. But would that help much in the current situation?  The AP states that Iran shall provide the Agency with access to any place on a site. [ AP, Artic...

More on DG Grossi report to UN Security Council, Sunday, June 22, 2025

IAEA Director General Grossi, in his statement to the UN Security Council on Sunday, June 22, 2025, addressed the matter of his inspectors in Iran:             “We must return to the negotiating table and allow the IAEA inspectors, the guardians of the NPT, to go back to Iran’s nuclear sites and account for the stockpiles of uranium, including, most importantly, the 400kg enriched to 60%. Any agreement, any arrangement will have as a prerequisite the establishment of the facts on the ground. This can be done only through IAEA inspections.            "IAEA inspectors are in Iran, and they must do their job. This will require a cessation of hostilities so that Iran can let the teams into the sites under the necessary safety and security conditions. Any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment can be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency. This is possible. ”...

The MOAB Atack; UN Security Council Emergency Meeting

More information is being reported on the U.S. MOAB attack. Here are highlights from a Reuters article, titled “ Satellite images indicate severe damage to Fordow .”       The 7 B-2 Stealth bombers, starting from and returning to Missouri in a 37-hour flight, dropped 14 MOABs on Iran. ‘ The B-2s dropped an initial load of six MOPs on Fordow, followed by a "double tap" of six more in the exact same spots ’. ‘ An impact hole above the underground enrichment halls at Natanz reportedly caused by a ’ MOAB. Probably there was a double tap also at Natanz, accounting for the 14th bomb.  Reporting to the 9941st (Emergency) Meeting of the UN Security Council on Sunday, June 22, Rafael Mariano Grossi, IAEA’s Director General, reported that craters are visible at the Fordow site. Here are published satellite photos of the surface area of Fordow before and after the attack. Reuters also reported:            Experts said satellite imagery fr...

Is Trump’s Special Military Operation over?

Too late. My suggestion yesterday for IAEA inspector action to determine whether the enriched uranium had been moved from Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan is no go after Trump’s Special Military Operation . Whether or not the three sites are totally destroyed, as Trump proclaimed, the near-term return of inspectors to those sites is not likely.    So, what’s next in the nuclear area? The Institute for the Study of War, an American nonprofit based in Washington, started their Iran Update Special Report on June 20, 2025, with this:              Iran is attempting to impose a dilemma on the United States and the international community: accept Iranian terms in nuclear negotiations or risk a long and challenging hunt for hidden Iranian nuclear material. Iranian officials posted that they had relocated their enriched material to a secure location, suggesting that destroying it would require a long, challenging, and possibly futile hunt for hidden ...

For purposes unknown

The Objective of NPT safeguards carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is “ the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown… ” [INFCIRC/153, para 28]. Compare that with the Basic Undertaking of safeguards: “ for the exclusive purpose of verifying that [nuclear] material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ” [INFCIRC/153, para 1]. Our colleague Myron Kratzer, who had a lead position in developing INFCIRC/153, would be smiling now; he enjoyed explaining why he pushed for and got the addition of “ purposes unknown ” in paragraph 28.   What does that mean? It means that the IAEA inspectors have only to detect that nuclear material that should be there is not there. They do not have to know for what purpose it was taken or where it is to declare that diversion has taken...

UF6 Cylinders

Iran is reported to have produced some 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% in the isotope U-235, enough with further enrichment to “weapon grade” (~90%) for up to 10 nuclear weapons. A big question now: what has happened to that stockpile since the beginning of the Israeli bombardment?  Here’s background on the form of the uranium and how it is stored and transported.  Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is the gas used in centrifuge uranium enrichment. It sublimes at 56.5°C (134°F) under atmospheric pressure. It can be liquefied and solidified for storage and transport.  UF6 is stored and transported in steel cylinders designed to contain the corrosive and radioactive UF6. Large 48Y cylinders are used for natural (0.7% U-235) and depleted UF6 and smaller 30B cylinders (photo) for low enriched UF6. High enriched uranium (20% or more U-235) hexafluoride is stored and transported in specialized cylinders, which are designed to prevent “criticality.”  IAEA inspectors routi...

More on MOABs

MOAB is a 30,000-pound steel-alloy, precision-guided bomb designed to destroy subterranean targets. Its proper name is GBU-57, also known as “bunker buster” or Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). MOP development dates to at least 2002. In 2007, the Air Force said it could penetrate up to 200 feet. The latest version, known as GBU-57E/B, has been in the operational inventory since 2016. In January 2018, the 4th upgrade was completed. Upgrades continue, especially improving the fuse.  The number available for operational use is not public; the initial order to Boeing was for 20. In February 2018, more were ordered. Some have been used in tests.  The small number of B-2 Spirit stealth bombers are the only aircraft that can deploy MOAB. There are no public reports of MOAB being used in combat. ( But it was reported that one was deployed in Afghanistan .)  Much of the impetus for the MOP program was provided by Iran’s push to bury its nuclear enrichment infrastructure deep und...

The Day After

Kelsey Davenport and Richard Nephew, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists webinar yesterday, placed emphasis on the major uncertainty about “ the day after .” Richard said that striking the military gong, as Israel has, changes all the theorizing that had been done about how the Iran conundrum might be resolved. It’s going to take some serious thinking to digest that.  An important point they both made was that Netanyahu’s (and others) goal of regime change in Iran is not an “ assured nonproliferation strategy .” The replacement may feel a greater need for a nuclear deterrent against Israel and the U.S. Or it may not. We cannot know.  IAEA DG Grossi told the UN Security Council on June 13 “ I have also been in contact with our inspectors in Iran and Israel. The safety of our staff is of paramount importance. All necessary actions are being taken to ensure they are not harmed .” He told the BBC on Monday that IAEA has not been able to carry out inspections since the attacks. ...

Time for MOABs?

In the 5th day of Netanyahu’s war on Iran, with the death ratio 10/1 Iran/Israel as Israel likes it (actually it is much higher in their wars on Gaza and Lebanon), news comes that President Trump has left the G7 meeting in Canada a day early to get back for a meeting he called of his National Security Council to discuss Netanyahu’s war.  Netanyahu wants U.S. military engagement especially the bombing of Fordo and Natanz with MOAB (Mother of All Bombs, which the U.S. developed at high cost specifically for use against Iran, and has only had one trial in Afghanistan). One can guess that the U.S. is already supplying intelligence and munitions, as well as knocking Iranian missiles and drones out of the sky. Netanyahu keeps calling for completing the job of destroying Iran’s uranium enrichment equipment underground at Fordo and Natanz. You can bet that the MOAB developers would welcome its use, to demonstrate what it can do and complete their job. And the Iran hawks in Washington are ...

Four Days in June, June 12-15, 2025

These have been quite some four days. Much to digest and many open questions. Here are some highlights and reactions.  IAEA Board Iran Resolution On Thursday, June 13, the E3 (France, Germany, U.K.) pushed their resolution on Iran through the IAEA Board of Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, which will lead to a report to the UN Security Council where further action can take place. That’s the way things looked on Thursday.  6th Round of U.S.-Iran Talk s The 6th round of U.S. (Witkoff)-Iran talks was first announced for Thursday, then moved to Sunday, June 15, in Oman. There seemed to be a stalemate on enrichment in Iran. On Saturday, Oman announced that the talks had been cancelled., while President Trump publicly encouraged Iran to resume the talks to reach agreement that Iran would give up uranium enrichment. That is U.S. negotiation tactics in the Trump era.  Israel Netanyahu had threatened to attack Iran. It was reported that...

Is the Israeli-U.S. attack on Iran about to happen?

Today’s news indicates that a military attack on Iran may be imminent. Apparently, both the Israel and U.S. militaries are not too otherwise occupied at the moment, so give them the order and let’s go! Here’s the reporting by Reuters:  • U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened Iran with bombing if it does not reach a new nuclear deal.  • Trump told the "Pod Force One" podcast on June 9: “ I’m less confident now than I would have been a couple of months ago. Something happened to [the Iranians], but I am much less confident of a deal being made .” “ But it would be nicer to do it without warfare, without people dying, it’s so much nicer to do it. But I don’t think I see the same level of enthusiasm for them to make a deal ."  • Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh said during a weekly press briefing: “ Some officials on the other side threaten conflict if negotiations don't come to fruition. If a conflict is imposed on us ... all U.S. bases are wit...

Iran’s defense against an IAEA Board resolution and UNSC snapback

Maziar Motamedi of Al Jazeera reported on June 10 that Behrouz Kamalvandi, deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, told Iranian state television late June 9 that the country will have a “proportionate” response to any action against it by Western countries, as well as the IAEA: “If we wanted to reduce our cooperation, the agency would not be able to carry out its duties. We have cooperated beyond our duties, and if the agency does not appreciate that, we will degrade cooperation to its normal levels,”.  The European signatories to JCPOA could activate a “snapback” mechanism that would reinstate all United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran lifted as part of the agreement. A strongly worded resolution at this week’s IAEA Board meeting could pave the way for that to happen. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi again warned this week that such a move would signal “another major strategic mistake” on the part of France, Germany and the UK.     ...

DG Grossi Statements on First Day of IAEA Board of Governors Meeting

What a range of Iran safeguards related topics Director General Grossi addressed today, in his Opening Statement to the IAEA BOG meeting, a press conference, and a reported interview.  Opening Statement .  • “ I call upon Iran urgently to cooperate fully and effectively with the International Atomic Energy Agency. ” That is a diplomatic way of saying that Iran is not fully and effectively cooperating as required by Paragraph 3 of its NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA.  • “Iran’s unilateral decision to stop implementation of modified Code 3.1 has led to a significant reduction in the Agency’s ability to verify whether Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful .” That is stretching things a bit. The information provided under Code 3.1 is not a direct sign of whether or not a nuclear program is peaceful. The reason that Code 3.1 was modified was to give IAEA more time to prepare to implement safeguards in a new facility. For Iran, it seems that the IAEA wants early no...

Snapback sanctions: “tempest in a cup of tea”

Commentators on the Iran nuclear issue are expressing their views on so-called “ snapback ” sanctions:  • Kian Shanfi , RFE/RL, May 29, 2025 - The JCPOA E3, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, are making repeated threats to call for “ snapback ” sanctions on Iran if it fails to reach an agreement with Washington by the end of June.   • Eldar Mamedov , Responsible Statecraft May 30, 2025 - The E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August 2025 if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then (reported by Reuters, May 13). UK, France, and Germany are pushing snap-back sanctions at just the wrong time.  • David Albright , ISIS, June 6, 2025 - [T]he E3 should trigger the reimposition of UN Iran sanctions via the snapback procedure outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and associated UN Resolution 2231. This action would also cause the return of the UN Security Council demand that Iran end its uranium enrichment program...

Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material remains in peaceful activities

The reader of UN Security Council resolution UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) may note and wonder about the phrase “ the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities .” That phrase appears 10 times in the body of UNSC/RES/2231 [para 6; Annex B, paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e)] and 4 times in the annexed JCPOA [paras 20, 23, 34iv; Annex 5, para 19]. In this blog, I will answer the questions: what does it mean, who wanted the phrase, and why did they want it. This story is relevant to an important current issue - Iran’s Additional Protocol.  What does “Broader Conclusion” mean? The history of this phrase is interesting. Up to the Iraq debacle, the IAEA drew an annual safeguards conclusion that the declared nuclear material in a state remained in peaceful activities. Now, in carrying out its obligations under an NPT safeguards agreement, IAEA did look for possible undeclared nuclear material or activities but with limited...

Iran Response to IAEA Board Report

While awaiting the IAEA DG’s comprehensive Iran report to the Board of Governors to be derestricted by the Board, two statements responding to the report are available on Iran’s Foreign Affairs website (en.mfa.gov.ir). They are appended at the end of this blog.  It is disheartening to see that the IAEA Board is so polarized on the Iran issue. Iran accuses the JCPOA E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom) and the U.S. of using the IAEA against them. The E3 and U.S. accuse Iran of preparing to breakout to go nuclear, against their commitment as an NPT member.   As a long-standing staff member, consultant and supporter of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, it is painful to see Iran making unjustified accusations about the Department’s politization under pressure from the E3 and the U.S. Yet, some of Iran’s points in the two statements ring true.  I will comment on some points in Iran’s two statements. Those are emboldened in the texts below.  Statement of Iranian FM a...

Enrichment flip-flop

Can you imagine anything worse than having to negotiate with Donald Trump? Yes, perhaps negotiating with Vladimir Putin is as bad or worse.   Axios and Reuters have done great investigative reporting on the U.S.-Iran negotiations. Here is my understanding on where things stand today.  Iran’s position . Reuters reported that "Iran's nuclear negotiations committee", under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, found the U.S. proposal was "completely one-sided" and could not serve Tehran's interests.  Sanctions relief is Iran’s priority and, as Axios reported, the U.S. side had so far not provided sufficient assurances in terms of when and how sanctions would be lifted.  Second priority is avoiding a military attack. Third priority is avoiding UN Security Council “snapback” sanctions. Keeping the talks with the U.S. going and not being the one saying “no” is Iran’s route for success with those two priorities.  Iran hopes that the way forwar...

“Serious concern”

  This photo of IAEA Director General Grossi accompanied an article in The San Diego Union Tribune on June 1 reporting on two reports he has submitted for the IAEA board meeting beginning on June 9. He is getting the visibility that he desires, as he looks to campaigning to become UN Secretary General. As Francois Murphy of Reuters reported on May 30 and 31, one IAEA report is a "comprehensive" account of issues including Iran's cooperation, as requested by an IAEA Board resolution in November 2024. As BBC and Reuters reported, the findings in that report pave the way for the US, Britain, France and Germany to push for the IAEA's board of governors to find Iran in violation of its non-proliferation obligations, for the first time in almost 20 years, a move bound to enrage Tehran. Diplomats told Reuters that it had not yet been determined at what point the Western powers would seek to have the matter referred to the Security Council, and it is unclear what action if ...