March 19, 1918 - First trip to Rainbow Division, and Secretary of War Baker

Don Martin diary entry for Tuesday, March 19, 1918:
Got up at 6 a.m. Started at 7 with Klauber and Orr [International News] for Luneville, headquarters of the Rainbow Division. Had breakfast at Nancy. This town has been bombed terribly. Most of the people have moved away. Ride was very cold. Waited three hours at Luneville for [Secretary of War, Newton]Baker. Saw him in a hospital where he was seeing American wounded men. Got story of his experiences in the trenches from Major [Fredrick] Palmer [Director AEF Press], but I also got a short talk with him which I have cabled to N.Y. and wired to Paris. I can see the censor is going to be the troublemaker.

(National Archives photo no. 111-SC-7842, Issoudon, February 1918)

Returned to Nancy where we had luncheon and then came back to Neufchateau which is the headquarters. Had dinner at the Officers Club. Met quite few people I know. Town filled with Americans. French getting as much money as possible out of them.

Weather cool. Shower in afternoon.

The AEF Press Office at Neufchateau, until the leadership of Frederick Palmer, provided automobiles each day to take the accredited correspondents to where they wanted to go. Here is a photo showing the lineup of autos in Neufchateau on April 25, 1918, with correspondents already in the first three cars ready to leave press headquarters for the front.

(National Archives photo no. 111-SC-11339, Neufchateau, April 25, 1918)

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