Skip to main content

January 18, 1918 - More stories about German submarines

Don Martin diary entry for Friday, January 18, 1918: 
Went to luncheon of American Luncheon Club with Russell. Then to office. Nothing much to do. Mr. Miller of United Press called for me and we went to dinner at Simpson’s. Went to office in the rain. At 12:30 at hotel met American sailors from S. I. [Nau Mark] who told me how they were fired at by submarine. Dictated cable and wrote story for Paris. War news quiet. Submarine sinkings low after 2 very bad weeks. Food situation here getting bad. Allies are worried about the threatened spring drive of Germany. Whole issue rests upon the submarines – whether the Allies can overcome it either by building enough new ships or destroying the subs. 
Weather sloppy but warm
    A story cabled to New York about a submarine attack, written on January 18,  was published in the New York Herald on Saturday, January 19, 1918.
American Line Steamship Attacked by Four U-Boats,   Her Guns Drive Them Off
Big Passenger Vessel Pursued by Squadron of Submarines—Shots are Fired at the Attackers and Hits Are Believed To Have Been Scored—Great Excitement Aboard
[Special Cable to the Herald via Commercial Cable Company’s System]
Herald Bureau, No. 130 Fleet Street, London, Friday
     An American line steamship reaching England to-day had a startling experience with submarines
     She almost overran one on a foggy night. This submarine and later submarines were seen on each side of the steamship.
     Shots were fired by the vessel’s guns and a fourth submarine was seen a few hours later, when more shots were fired from the steamship.
     It is believed that some of the shots scored a hit.
     Destroyers chased the submarines and great excitement constantly prevailed aboard the steamship while the U-boats were threatening her.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

‘New war with Israel at any moment’, ‘still digging through rubble’

The news about Iran has taken an ominous tone in the last couple days. Here is some reporting and commentary.  Newsweek on August 18, 2025, reported that Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said ‘ We are not in a ceasefire; we are in a stage of war. No protocol, regulation, or agreement has been written between us and the U.S. or Israel. A new war with Israel could break out at any moment .’  Yonah Jeremy Bob commented in The Jerusalem Post on August 19, 2025, that ‘ Khamenei can either “drink from the poisoned chalice” of diplomatic concessions … or face more airstrikes, possibly next time some targeting him directly ’.   Bob also noted that ‘ right now Iran is still digging through rubbl e’. The U.S. attacked Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan on June 22. Two months of digging. No surprise that there has been no public news about that.

Assessing possible outcomes of the snapback mechanism

The initiation by the E3 of the 30-day snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council makes everything more difficult and there is great uncertainty about the outcome. Will it be peaceful with a new nuclear deal with Iran, negotiated by the U.S., endorsed by the UNSC and verified by IAEA, or will Iran withdraw from NPT with further military action by Israel and the U.S.?                 To perhaps shed a little light on what the outcome will be, here is my analysis of how the players - Iran, U.S. and E3 - may be assessing the acceptability of the range of outcomes. Four levels of acceptability were used: 1 Fully acceptable; 2 Less acceptable; 3 Just acceptable; and 4 Not acceptable. Four near term 30-day outcomes are listed, and two optimistic outcomes with an interim U.S.-Iran agreement reached within a 6-month extension.                 For the 30-day near term, the best outcome would b...

‘Making nuclear fuel’ under the NPT

It is with some hesitation that I take issue with the latest publication of the renowned Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni on August 15 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, titled: “ Actually, the NPT doesn’t guarantee a right to make nuclear fuel .”  But someone should defend the IAEA and international safeguards! Here are points in question.            ‘ The [NPT] treaty was designed to prevent dangerous bombmaking activitie s.’  NPT is far more complex than that. It is common to state the three pillars of NPT: nuclear disarmament; nuclear nonproliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Nonproliferation involves the commitment of non-nuclear states not to pursue nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA inspection to confirm that commitment is being followed. Perhaps Sokolsky intends to refer to INFCIRC/153, which lays out how IAEA and the state cooperate to carry out that confirmation. If so, INFCIRC/153 is not designed to ‘prevent’...