The initiation by the E3 of the 30-day snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council makes everything more difficult and there is great uncertainty about the outcome. Will it be peaceful with a new nuclear deal with Iran, negotiated by the U.S., endorsed by the UNSC and verified by IAEA, or will Iran withdraw from NPT with further military action by Israel and the U.S.?                 To perhaps shed a little light on what the outcome will be, here is my analysis of how the players - Iran, U.S. and E3 - may be assessing the acceptability of the range of outcomes. Four levels of acceptability were used: 1 Fully acceptable; 2 Less acceptable; 3 Just acceptable; and 4 Not acceptable. Four near term 30-day outcomes are listed, and two optimistic outcomes with an interim U.S.-Iran agreement reached within a 6-month extension.                 For the 30-day near term, the best outcome would b...

While waiting for news from the UNSC closed door meeting today on the E3 snapback mechanism initiation, it is instructive to note what the players involved have said to the media, which is probably similar to the positions taken in the meeting.  Russia  Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs : “ We strongly condemn these actions by European countries and call on the international community to reject them .”  Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s UN Ambassado r: The " move by E3 cannot and should not entail any legal or procedural effect. It's a mere escalatory step. Western countries…don't care about diplomacy, and they care only about, blackmail and, threats, and coercion of independent countries. The world is at a crossroads. It's quite clear. One option is peace, diplomacy and goodwill. Another option is…diplomacy at the barrel of the gun…extortion and blackmail .” " The United States abandoned JCPOA, and since then the situation started [to] deteriorate. We all know that t...

On August 28, 2025, Britain, France and Germany initiated in the UN Security Council a 30-day ‘snapback mechanism’ process that can restore UN sanctions on Iran that were modified under JCPOA in 2015. All U.N. sanctions on Iran would be reimposed in 30 days unless the Security Council takes other action. [ UNSC/RES/2231, paras 36, 37 ] Here is where matters stand on August 28, 2025.  At the request of the E3, the Security Council is to meet behind closed doors on August 29, 2025, to discuss the snapback move. [ Reuters ]  The UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting   within 30 days . [JCPOA, para 37]   What the applicable procedures are for that vote are not crystal clear.   Possible extension : Iran and the E3 have held several rounds of talks aiming to agree to defer the snapback mechanism.  Russia and China have circulated a draft resolution to the Security Council that wo...

          First, the good news: IAEA inspectors are back in Iran for inspection of nuclear facilities that were not attacked in the 12-day war in June. It is reported that IAEA inspectors will perform inspection during refuelling at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.            Second, the OK news: the E3 and Iran met again, in Geneva on Aug 26, for further discussion of the E3 threat to activate ‘ snapback ’ sanctions under UNSC/RES/2231, with the result being agreeing to meet again.            Third, the exciting news: Iran International reported that Russia and China have played a diplomatic card, circulating to the UN Security Council members a draft resolution calling for a six-month technical extension of UNSC/RES/2231 to April 18, 2026, with the possibility of further extensions, while urging all original participants to resume negotiations immediately.       ...

With the approach of the E3’s end-of-August deadline, the September 10-19 IAEA Board of Governors meeting and General Conference and the October 18 termination of UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) and JCPOA , hopefully there is thinking about how to make progress on the Iran nuclear case without causing a crisis. The worst-case outcome would be notice by Iran of its withdrawal from the NPT.  I was pleased to see my old colleagues Mark Goodman and Mark Fitzpatrick capably address “ What if Iran withdraws from the NPT ?” in the June 25 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Here are several points they made and my thoughts. Israel’s war of choice is likely to have the … effect of speeding up a step off the cliff.  On June 16, the foreign ministry spokesperson announced that Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, was preparing a bill that would withdraw Iran from the NPT.            Yes, the possibility of Iran’s NPT withdrawal should be taken seriously.  If Iran were ...

Hugh Chalmers of VERTIC wrote in the Bulleting of Atomic Scientists on August 12 about reestablishing IAEA safeguards in Iran after the June Israel/U.S. attacks. Two points are of particular interest.  1. Chalmers properly raises the importance of the 2025 IAEA General Conference on September 15-19 at which the Iran issue will be a topic. He writes the following:            IAEA member states differ on the legality of the military strikes and the IAEA’s statutory role and mandate to respond to them. These differences may be put on display at the September [IAEA General] Conference. If they are, member states will need to agree on some language that reinforces existing prohibitions and restrictions in this regard whilst retaining buy-in from Washington. A clear expression of restraint from member states—including from the United States—at the general conference could go some way to reassuring Iran that it will not be punished for complying with its...

Newsweek’s reporting on the potential effect of the UN Security Council ‘snapback’ sanctions had a significant difference between August 21 and 22.  Amir Daftari wrote on Aug 22: ‘ With the August 31 [E3] deadline approaching, Iran faces … the potential return of sweeping U.N. sanctions on its economy .’  That makes the snapback sound serious. But Amira El-Fekki wrote on August 21: ‘ The return of U.N. sanctions on Iran would include an arms embargo, missile and drone restrictions, bans on most nuclear activity, and travel, banking and asset freezes on designated Iranian entities and individuals .’  [Iranian Foreign Minister] Araghchi dismissed their effectiveness. " The economic sanctions of the Security Council are far more limited than the current unilateral U.S. sanctions. Things will not become any worse than the current situation. Yes, from a psychological and political, and even strategic point of view, there are consequences, but not to the extent that it would br...

With a week to go to the August 29 deadline set by the E3 (Britain, France, Germany) for when they will decide to try to activate the so-called “snapback” provision of UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) and JCPOA, the tempest is stirring the teapot.  ‘Hats off’ to Amira El-Fekki of Newsweek for her reporting on this. Here are some notable statements this week.  Abbas Araghchi , Iranian Foreign Minister: " [E3] think the snapback is the only tool they have. Here we have clearly explained our position: first, you have basically no right to use it as you, too, have effectively withdrawn from the deal following the U.S. withdrawal, and with your recent positions, including the zero enrichment. So you're no longer a participant in the JCPOA, and the right to snapback belongs only to remaining members. "  Mikhail Ulyanov , Russia's permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna: " The [E3] are themselves in violation of RES/2231 and the JCPOA. Therefore, legally s...

The news about Iran has taken an ominous tone in the last couple days. Here is some reporting and commentary.  Newsweek on August 18, 2025, reported that Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said ‘ We are not in a ceasefire; we are in a stage of war. No protocol, regulation, or agreement has been written between us and the U.S. or Israel. A new war with Israel could break out at any moment .’  Yonah Jeremy Bob commented in The Jerusalem Post on August 19, 2025, that ‘ Khamenei can either “drink from the poisoned chalice” of diplomatic concessions … or face more airstrikes, possibly next time some targeting him directly ’.   Bob also noted that ‘ right now Iran is still digging through rubbl e’. The U.S. attacked Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan on June 22. Two months of digging. No surprise that there has been no public news about that.

It is with some hesitation that I take issue with the latest publication of the renowned Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni on August 15 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, titled: “ Actually, the NPT doesn’t guarantee a right to make nuclear fuel .”  But someone should defend the IAEA and international safeguards! Here are points in question.            ‘ The [NPT] treaty was designed to prevent dangerous bombmaking activitie s.’  NPT is far more complex than that. It is common to state the three pillars of NPT: nuclear disarmament; nuclear nonproliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Nonproliferation involves the commitment of non-nuclear states not to pursue nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA inspection to confirm that commitment is being followed. Perhaps Sokolsky intends to refer to INFCIRC/153, which lays out how IAEA and the state cooperate to carry out that confirmation. If so, INFCIRC/153 is not designed to ‘prevent’...

The E3 (Britan, France, Germany) upped their ante with a letter to the UN Security Council on August 12, 2025, that included: ‘ if Iran is not willing to reach a diplomatic solution before the end of August 2025, or does not seize the opportunity of an extension, E3 are prepared to trigger the snapback mechanism ’. (AP, Aug 13, 2025)  So far, we have an Iranian response from Parliament member Manouchehr Mottaki — who was Iran’s top diplomat for five years in the 2000s — saying the Iranian parliament has a “ finger on the trigger ” for quitting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. “ We only need 24 hours to approve quitting the nuclear deal, ” if the E3 raises the issue at the U.N. Security Council, Mottaki said. (AP, Aug 13, 2025)  On ‘extension’, following July’s meeting in Istanbul [between E3 and Iran], an E3 diplomat said Iran could delay [snapback] by doing two things [1] renewing cooperation with the Vienna-based IAEA and [2] addressing concerns about its highly enriche...

Good news. The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported on August 11 that the IAEA’s deputy director general and head of the Department of Safeguards Massimo Aparo held talks in Tehran that day with Iranian officials. Tehran Times reported that both sides agreed to advance technical discussions and continue the consultations.  Bad news . Tehran Times also reported that, during the meeting, the ‘ Iranian delegation strongly criticized the IAEA’s silence in response to recent attacks—carried out with U.S. support and involvement—against nuclear facilities in Fordo, Isfahan, and Natanz.’ Iran demanded ‘corrective measures for its "improper processes" regarding Iran’s nuclear activities ’.  Iran International’s report on August 12 notes ‘ Tehran continues to bar IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, accusing him of complicity in the recent attacks .’  What is going on here ? From the IAEA side, they wish to work with Iran to continue the implementation of its NPT safeguar...

Trump’s special envoy Witkoff has hit the capitals again; in Tel Aviv Netanyahu probably told him to tell Trump that he will take over all of Gaza; in Moscow Putin probably told him to tell Trump that Ukraine will be destroyed and forget the sanctions. Witkoff didn’t get to number 3 on his list, Iran. But Trump played another ‘ getting to a deal ’ with Iran card, adding sanctions he can later get credit for removing. And the Middle East commentators are worriedly reacting to the Iran situation. Here are some highlights.  From Newsweek:       The U.S. announced on July 30 the largest Iran-related sanctions since 2018 , targeting entities and vessels linked to the country's petroleum sector: 20 oil firms, 5 vessel management companies, 1 wholesaler, and over 115 individuals in 17 countries and regions, including the U.K., Italy, Switzerland, India, the UAE and Hong Kong.       U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said: "Today's Depar...

With the world’s spotlights focused on Israel-Gaza, it seems that “all’s quiet on the Iran front.” We imagine that Iran is digging out at Fordow and Isfahan and probably Natanz. We await news of the resumption of IAEA inspections in Iran, at the nuclear power plant Bushehr and other nuclear locations not bombarded by Israel. And we wonder what other nuclear activities Iran might be undertaking in this period of calm.  Here's what Foreign Minister Araghchi is reported to have said over the weekend (by The Jerusalem Post): Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said, in an interview with the Iranian Student News Agency, that Iran could still strike Israel despite the blows the republic took in June. “ The aggression has stopped, and in turn our right to defend has stopped. That’s it. There is no ceasefire agreement; there is nothing else. They stopped the aggression without any conditions, and we stopped the defense. When there is no aggression, naturally, there is no reason to defend our...