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If, Until, and There’s No Hurry

If Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi meets with Donald Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, I can imagine Araghchi’s message would be something like this: 
• Tell President Trump that we are ready and willing to restart talks if the U.S. guarantees that there will be no military strikes on Iran during the negotiations by the U.S. or by Israel. If there are military strikes by Israel and/or the U.S., Iran will give its 3-month notice of withdrawal from the NPT because the U.S. will have demonstrated that it is an existential threat to Iran. 
 • Also tell President Trump that, to ensure the safety of IAEA inspectors while in Iran, we have suspended our cooperation with IAEA under our NPT safeguards agreement until the U.S. guarantees no military strikes by Israel and/or the U.S. 
 • Further, tell President Trump that there is no hurry. As Jennifer Kavanagh and Rosemary Kelani wrote in Foreign Affairs on June 25, 2025: 
            With Iran’s nuclear program set back and its ballistic missile infrastructure severely damaged, there is not an urgent need for either a deal or further military action. 

A slow timescale is favorable for Iran. In October UNSC/RES/2231 comes to an end. Even if the E3 starts the dispute resolution process under JCPOA, it is unlikely to get to a UNSC vote on snapback sanctions on Iran, and even if the E3 with U.S. pressure (tariffs!) on UNSC members were to get a vote, few countries would implement it. Most of the world is on Iran’s side after the illegal military attacks by Israel and the U.S. 

Will the U.S., can the U.S., give a credible guarantee that neither the U.S. nor Israel will attack Iran while negotiation of a deal is going on? 

 Netanyahu said on July 9, “I think the Iranians understand that what the US and Israel did once we could do twice, and thrice.” He added that Iran won’t attempt to renew nuclear efforts “Because they’re afraid.” 

With such open threats, why would Iranian leaders believe a “guarantee”, especially regarding Israel. Probably their plan is to drag things out as long as they can, hoping that there is an election in Israel and Netanyahu loses, or Donald Trump gets tired of the whole mess in the Middle East and gives up on it. Meanwhile, they will bide their time and rebuild their air defenses, while engaging with Saudi Arabia and UAE and Oman on strengthening their relationships. 

 The question is, will Donald Trump and Netanyahu let things play out that way?

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