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E3 Snapback and Rafael Grossi in Singapore

There was a lot of reporting on July 25 about the Iran conundrum. Here are summaries on two topics with some comments. 

E3 Snapback 
E3 and Iran met on July 25 in Istanbul. The E3 had agreed to snapback United Nations sanctions on Iran on August 29 if there is no progress on a nuclear deal. However, E3 does have the ability to defer snapback beyond October 18 —the date the snapback provision expires, ten years after JCPOA was adopted. E3 offered Tehran a temporary delay in triggering the snapback mechanism, on condition that Tehran re-engage diplomatically, cooperate fully with the IAEA, and address concerns over its rapidly growing uranium stockpile. They want Iran to take concrete steps to convince them to extend the October 18 deadline by up to six months. E3 and Iran agreed to continue discussions. 
This sideshow keeps bubbling along. Only the Iranian reports emphasize that sanctions removal was number one on Iran’s discussion list. Iran wants E3 to try to influence Trump to remove at least some sanctions. Will the E3 governments do that? Unlikely at best. 
And now E3 has come up with a possible way to stay a bit in the game, talking about extending UNSC/RES/2231 (2015) by up to 6 months. I guess they believe there is a way for them to do that, probably through a new resolution. But don’t you expect Russia would veto it? In addition, their conditions are unworkable. Cooperate fully with IAEA by October? Forget it. Address concerns about its HEU stockpiles by October? The digging out at Fordow and Isfahan will still be ongoing, and don’t expect Iran to tell the important details about what they find. 

 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in Singapore on July 2
Rafael Grossi told reporters that he was optimistic that IAEA inspections might restart this year and that it was important to discuss the technical details now. On Wednesday, July 23, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Iran had agreed on an IAEA technical team visit in the coming weeks, but not to go to the nuclear sites. 
Rafael Grossi said Iran must be transparent about its facilities and activities. The IAEA has proposed that Iran start discussions on "the modalities as to how to restart or begin (inspections) again. So this is what we are planning to do, perhaps starting on technical details and, later, moving on to high level consultations. We need to agree on where to go, how to do it. We need to listen to Iran in terms of what they consider should be the precautions to be taken." Technical teams sent to Iran for talks will not include inspectors. 
Grossi said he had no further information from Iran on the status and whereabouts of its stock of some 400 kg of highly enriched uranium. "This is why it is so important that we engage as soon as possible and that we can start our inspection.” 
What is important about Grossi’s remarks is that he is accepting that the IAEA Department of Safeguards has the lead in dealing with Iran on continuing to implement Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement. He calls that ‘technical details’ but it is IAEA safeguards implementation. Let’s hope that he accepts that ‘moving on to higher level consultations’ , i.e. to him, is not necessary or appropriate soon. Iran has said he is not welcome there and would be arrested. DG Grossi, let the Safeguards team do their job
On Grossi’s remark about inspection and the 400 kg of 60% Uranium, he goes too far. IAEA must wait and see how Iran handles that matter. And it is likely that Iran will be in no hurry to provide information because both Netanyahu and Trump repeatedly state they are ready to bomb Iran again ‘if necessary’. What would you do in that situation?

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