Enriched Uranium - We think we know where it is

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, asked on July 9 in Washington about Iran’s enriched uranium, said “The one thing that we didn’t deal with that we knew we didn’t deal with was the enriched uranium… We think we know where it is… It has to be made clear to [Iran], and I think it has been, that they don’t get this enriched uranium.”

Satellite imagery shows Iran is digging out entrances to Fordow and Isfahan. That will take time. Why should Iran be in a hurry? In any case, Iran will consider what they find is their business and no one else’s. What Iran is likely to do is state publicly that much, perhaps all, of the enriched uranium inventory at Fordow was destroyed by Trump’s so successful “obliteration”. They may declare some amount of recovered enriched uranium to IAEA. Something similar would be done for the enriched uranium that was stored underground at Isfahan; some amount of recovered enriched uranium might be declared to IAEA. The total declared will be a fraction of the 408 kg 60% Uranium last reported by IAEA.

Israel is claiming that it knows what enriched uranium Iran has and where it is and will be. At some point, Netanyahu will ask his Nobel-peace-prize nominated buddy Donald Trump for assistance is “obliterating” it. What will Donald Trump do? Impossible to predict. The U.S. has a small number of Mother-of-all-bombs (MOABs) left. Will Trump use them on Iran or save them for North Korea or China?

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