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IAEA’s Report for 2024 on Safeguards in Iran

IAEA has published on its website the public part of its Safeguards Implementation Report for 2024. What IAEA says about its relationship with Iran is instructive. Here is a condensed version of the information about Iran in the Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary; it comes in two parts, first on NPT implementation and second on JCPOA implementation. 

States with NPT CSAs in force but no APs in force -- Islamic Republic of Iran 
In 2024, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted two resolutions, in which it reaffirmed that it was “essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues”, take without delay the actions specified in these resolutions. [In June 2025, a further Board resolution found Iran in noncompliance.] 

Nevertheless, outstanding issues on Iran’s NPT obligations remained unresolved, specifically, uranium particles detected at undeclared locations in Iran, and a discrepancy between uranium declared and amount verified by IAEA at a facility. Unless and until Iran resolves these outstanding safeguards issues, IAEA will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. 

Iran continued not to implement its legally obligated modified Code 3.1 [early design information] of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Iran has announced start of construction of two nuclear power plants and a research reactor but has not provided preliminary design information as required under modified Code 3.1.

Iran’s withdrawal of the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors affected IAEA’s ability during 2024 to conduct verification at declared enrichment facilities. Iran agreed in November 2024 to consider designation of additional inspectors; subsequently Iran rejected four proposed inspectors. 

In response to Iran’s expansion throughout 2024 of its enrichment capacity and production of both high and low enriched uranium, IAEA strengthened its safeguards approach at facilities producing and storing high enriched uranium. 

Verification and Monitoring in Iran under the JCPOA [United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)] 
On February 23, 2021, Iran stopped implementation of all its nuclear-related commitments under JCPOA, including implementing its Additional Protocol. In June 2022 Iran removed all of IAEA’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment. Consequently, IAEA has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate. 

Throughout 2024, Iran continued to accumulate enriched uranium well beyond the limits agreed under the JCPOA. Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State that is producing and stockpiling high enriched uranium.

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