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April 25, 1918 - American correspondents have their picture taken in Neufchateau


Don Martin diary entry for Thursday, April 25, 1918: 
Visited Ansauville with Gregg. It has been shelled since my last visit and is by no means a safe place. Saw the old church which went untouched through all bombardments till this last which left several holes in it. Had luncheon at Toul with Gregg, [John T.]  Parkerson and [Bert] Ford. Got back to Neufchateau at 5. Had dinner at club. Gregg is a nice chap but certainly has a great admiration for the Germans. I tell him his right name usually once a day. Told him today the American who criticises England or France and sees virtue in anything German is by far the most dangerous propagandist of all.
German offensive against British growing in violence. Is making headway.

Rainy + raw.
        The war correspondents stood for a group photo in Neufchateau on April 25, 1918. Don Martin in front row, second from left.
Front row, Left to right:J. W. Grigg, (New York World), Don Martin (New York Herald), Captain F. P. Adams, (Stars and Stripes), Bert Ford (International News Service). Back row, Left to right: C. Kenimore (St. Louis Post Dispatch), F. J. Taylor (United Press), Frank P. Sibley (Boston Globe), Henri Bazin (Philadelphia Public Ledger), John T. Parkerson (Associated Press). (Source: National Archives photo No. 111-SC-11337, Neufchateau, April 25, 1918)



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