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April 10, 1918 - Don Martin returns to Neufchateau in anticipation of going to the front

Don Martin diary entry for Wednesday, April 10, 1918
Went back to Neufchateau to get my typewriter, boots etc. for a trip to the front. Very uninteresting ride. Train an hour late at Gondrecourt. Auto waiting to take me to Neufchateau. Sent short cable to N.Y. on American scrap near Toul. Spent the evening at the club.

Weather miserable.
     Don Martin wrote a letter to daughter Dorothy dated April 10 from the Hotel de Crillon, in which he showed his itchiness to get to the front:
I came to Paris day before yesterday to see what could be done about getting up to where the great big battle is being fought. I may be able to arrange it... There is just a chance that I shall leave here Saturday to go to some place not a great way from Paris to get a glimpse of a part of the big battle.
     The short cable mentioned was published in the New York Herald on Thursday, April 11, 1918. How Don Martin got that news while in Paris is not clear.
Americans Stop German Attack Near Toul
Eight Hundred Huns Rehearse Attack, 
But Are Stunned by American Fire on St. Mihiel Salient
By DON MARTIN
[Special cable to the Herald]
WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY IN FRANCE, Wednesday
        The prompt and effective fire of the American batteries yesterday frustrated a carefully prepared attack of the Germans on the American sector northwest of Toul. Two Germans were captured, one of whom died from his wounds.
       The prisoners said a force of eight hundred men rehearsed the attack on the sector but were stunned by the severity of the American fire.

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