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To War or Not to War, that is the Question

It is no surprise to learn that Mr. Netanyahu has moved forward his next visit to the White House from February 18 to Wednesday, February 11. The commentary on the U.S.-Iran meeting in Oman on February 6 was too optimistic. It sounded like a repeat of Steve Witkoff trying to find a way to a nuclear deal with Iran, which led to Netanyahu attacking Iran in June 2025 to stop such a deal. Now Netanyahu wants the U.S. and Israel to jointly “mow the grass” in Iran, focusing on ballistic missiles and killing off the political and military leadership. 
        Netanyahu is also not happy with Trump’s pushing forward on Phase II of the Gaza peace plan, and Trump’s plan to schedule the first meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington on February 19 to focus on funding of Gaza rebuilding. Netanyahu has not signed up Israel on the Board of Peace, and it will be interesting to see if he attends the first meeting (or somehow succeeds in getting that meeting cancelled). 
        It was interesting to read what Ilan Goldenberg and Nate Swanson wrote in their article in Foreign Affairs dated Jan 31, 2026, America’s Best Chance to Transform Iran:The United States must also play a stabilizing regional role. Trump can leverage his overwhelming popularity in Israel to restrain Netanyahu, making clear that the United States does not support a strike…’ 
        Meanwhile, Steve Erlanger reported in the New York Times on Feb 7, 2026, that Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute has learned that some Iranians believe for diplomacy to work, “a short, intense war may be necessary to correct Trump’s perception and compel him to adopt more realistic demands.” Parsi said, even if Iran takes large losses in such a war, so will the Americans and Israelis, and “Trump has less tolerance for losses or a protracted war.’ 

        What will President Trump do about Iran? To War of Not to War, that is the Question.

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