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Is war Iran’s better option?

The Iranian regime is talking itself into thinking that war with the U.S. and Israel is their better way forward under present circumstances, and that it is coming soon. Here is what Iran-knowledgeable commentators published on February 21-22. 

        Ata Mohammed Tabriz’s article in Iran International, Why war may no longer be the worst outcome for Tehran, made these points: 
        • [C]onfrontation is as civilizational as it is geopolitical. Resistance, even at high cost, is framed as a test of faith in a larger struggle between opposing moral forces. 
        • Victory, in this view, depends not solely on material advantage but on steadfast adherence to divine principles. Even loss or sacrifice can be reframed as spiritual triumph. 
        • [D]iplomacy and confrontation carry risks, but only confrontation preserves the possibility of strategic recovery. 
        • [C]ompromise carries existential risks. War, paradoxically, may appear less dangerous. 
        • State-aligned commentators and officials increasingly describe the confrontation in existential terms. 

        Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh wrote in the New York Times: 
        • [T]he clerical regime no longer views being bombed by America or Israel as an existential threat.

        Farnaz Fassihi, in the article in the New York Times titled Inside Iran’s Preparations for War and Plans for Survival, wrote: 
        • Iran is operating on the basis that U.S. military strikes are inevitable and imminent.

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