Iran International reported on Jan 28, 2026, that Mohammad Eslami, Iran’s nuclear chief, said on January 28 that if Iran’s nuclear sites have been bombed and destroyed, the IAEA has no grounds to demand continued oversight. He said Iran had not breached its NPT commitments and the IAEA should act strictly within its statutory mandate.
IAEA’s mandate under Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement is to verify the declared nuclear material in the State. The last verification by IAEA before the bombings by Israel started on June 13, 2025, were:
• 441 kg 60%-U235 - most at Fordow, a small amount at above ground facility at Natanz;
• 184 kg 20%-U235 - split between above ground Natanz and Fordow;
• 6,024 kg up to 5%-U235 - around half at Natanz underground, and half at Fordow.
Fordow was attacked with 12 US bunker buster bombs, which likely did substantial damage to the centrifuge cascades (which contain small amounts of uranium). What happened to the UF6 cylinders which contain the enriched uranium has not been disclosed by Iran.
Natanz was bombed at ground level by Israel, destroying the electrical supply and HVAC systems, and underground by 2 US bunker buster bombs. That is thought to have caused substantial damage to the centrifuges below and above ground. What happened to the UF6 cylinders with the enriched uranium has not been disclosed by Iran.
At Isfahan, the US used Tomahawk missiles to bomb the three entrances to an underground tunnel complex, which was too deep in the mountain to be reached by the US bunker buster bombs. Whether enriched uranium had been moved into that tunnel complex has not been disclosed by Iran; unverified reports said that had happened. IAEA inspectors had not been in that tunnel complex.
Satellite imagery has provided some information about Iran’s activities at those sites since the 12-day war ended:
At Fordow, limited activity at the entrances has been seen;
At Natanz, little activity has been seen at the underground entrances; installation of roofing has been observed at an above ground building, suggesting that activity there is being shielded from satellite imagery.
At Isfahan, there has been substantial activity at all three entrances, most recently, covering them with concrete and soil. That is thought to be protection from further attack.
What should IAEA’s verification objectives be at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan? Iran has not presented IAEA with a new declaration of the nuclear material at those sites (including ‘special reports’), in accordance with its safeguards agreement. What IAEA can and should implement, in safeguards jargon, is ‘continuity of knowledge’ measures.
IAEA must assume that the nuclear material it verified, or some of it, is at Fordow and Natanz. And they must assume that nuclear material may have been moved into the Isfahan tunnel complex. IAEA should inform Iran that it wants to implement ‘continuity of knowledge’ measures at the three sites, and to verify any nuclear material movements out of or into them. Iran should be informed that assisting IAEA to implement those safeguards measures is part of the cooperation called for in Article 3 of their safeguards agreement.
And the future? It cannot be expected that Iran will declare to IAEA the location and status of its enriched uranium as long at the United States and Israel continue to loudly pronounce that they will bomb Iran again. And as long as Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu are in power, those threats will remain. So, ‘continuity of knowledge’ may be all there can be for the indefinite future.
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