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September 2, 1918: Don Martin sees ruins of Soissons

Don Martin diary entry for Monday, September 2, 1918: 
Went to the 32nd division with [Edwin] James [New York Times]. Brought [Caroll] McNutt [Colliers] back in our car. Came back through Soissons which is in ruins. Only front wall of the cathedral is standing. While we were there about 50 guns in and around Soissons began a barrage to blaze a way for the advance by the Moroccans who have gone in the line in place of the Americans. Wrote cable for N.Y.
     Published in the New York Herald on Tuesday, September 3, 1918.
AMERICANS HURL GERMANS NORTH FROM JUVIGNY
Whole Countryside Behind Hun Lines Ablaze with Burning Munition Dumps
By DON MARTIN
Special Correspondent of the Herald with the American Armies in France
(Special Cable to the Herald)
WITH THE AMERICAN ARMIES IN FRANCE, Monday
           In a splendid dash forward the American forces operating north of Soissons have pushed away ahead of Juvigny and have captured many prisoners. They have started the Huns on their probably retreat to the Chemin des Dames.
         Our stalwart troops drove everything ahead of them, despite the fact that the Germans pitted their crack troops. The Huns are everywhere unable to check our victorious onrush.
           The sky to-night is lit up with fires caused by the enemy burning his ammunition dumps and supplies as he retreats northward.

           Our losses are small. Many Germans were killed.
        This illustration, published in the Paris Herald on September 1, gives a graphic image of what the fighting was like.

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