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September 9, 1918: Don Martin makes quick trip into Paris and back to Meaux

Don Martin diary entry for Monday, September 9, 1918: 
Went to Paris to attend to the transfer of my bank account from London to Paris. Came right back. Nothing to do in the evening. The 77th division made two attacks last night and today but apparently did not make a success of them so we are writing nothing. Sat around in the evening with F. Noble Hall of the London Times.
       Don Martin’s daily report for Paris on Monday, September 9, was a short one, published as usual in the Paris Herald on Tuesday, September 10.
ENEMY TAKES STEPS TO GUARD AGAINST SURPRISE BY YANKS
Machine-Gun Crews Are Reinforced in Ravines North of the Vesle Heights
 (SPECIAL TELEGRAM TO THE HERALD)
By DON MARTIN
WITH THE AMERICAN ARMIES, Monday
            There was little activity last night and to-day in the American sector north of the Vesle. There were skirmishes between patrols and a savage exchange of artillery fire during the night, but no infantry action of importance.

           The line there remains about as it was three days ago. The Germans apparently have brought up new machine-gun crews to meet any attacks the Americans attempt. They have them concealed in all the ravines north of the Vesle heights.

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