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May 29, 2025 -- Expected Israeli attack

The New York Times reported: U.S. officials were concerned Israel could decide to strike Iran with little warning and said U.S. intelligence estimated that Israel could mount an attack on Iran in as little as seven hours. 

The bombing of the enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz will use the largest conventional bombs, so-called MOAB “Mother of All Bombs.” The destruction will be enormous; it is probable that any personnel in those facilities will be killed or injured. 

 Therefore, no IAEA inspectors should be at the nuclear facilities in Iran at the time of the bombing. Assuring the physical safety of IAEA inspectors becomes its Director General’s highest priority. 

 I would like to see the Israeli government commit that the IAEA Director General will receive advance notice of bombing so that Agency inspectors can move to safe locations inside or out of the country. 

An Australian colleague, retired nonproliferation lawyer diplomat, informed me that there is an international treaty that addresses this situation, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (see https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1994/12/19941215%2007-58%20AM/Ch_XVIII_8p.pdf). The convention expressly includes IAEA officials and experts. 

 The US signed the convention in 1994 but has not ratified it (i.e. is not a party see https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-8&chapter=18 ). Under international law a signatory to a treaty is obliged not to act inconsistently with the object of the treaty. The IAEA Director General (DG) should raise this concern, and the existence of this convention, with members of the Board of Governors (BOG), and call all member states to act in accordance with the convention. The BOG could consider referring their concerns to the UN Security Council. 

 Regarding how long the advance notice should be, seven hours is not enough. I think the IAEA should ask for 72 hours; the minimum would be 24 hours. If Israel refuses to commit to giving IAEA sufficient notice, I would argue that the DG has a duty to withdraw IAEA personnel from dangerous situations. He must consider it his duty to inform the IAEA Board of Governors that he is considering stopping inspections in Iran because the threat to the safety of Agency inspectors from Israeli bombing is too great. That announcement would get a really impressive reaction

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