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IAEA DG Grossi on Iran’s Additional Protocol

Francois Murphy of Reuters reported on May 28 what IAEA Director General Grossi said that day about Iran’s Additional Protocol: 

     [Grossi] stopped short of saying Iran should resume implementation of the Additional Protocol. Iran implemented it under the 2015 deal, until the U.S. exit in 2018. Asked if he meant the protocol should be applied, Grossi said "I'm very practical," adding that this was not a subject in the talks. While the IAEA is not part of the talks, he said he was in touch with both sides, including U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff. "I don't think they are discussing [the Additional Protocol] in these terms. I don't see the discussion as being a discussion on legal norms to be applied or not. I tend to see this as more of an ad hoc approach," said Grossi. 

 If DG Grossi is correct, that is good news. Iran’s Additional Protocol is not being considered as part of an extra-NPT agreement (as it was in JCPOA). However, DG Grossi missed an opportunity to respond to the question stressing the importance of Iran implementing its Additional Protocol to increase the assurance IAEA can provide that Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful. See my post on May 28, 2025. DG Grossi has a domestic problem with the Additional Protocol as his country, Argentina, is one of the few NPT states that has not implemented one, for no good reason.

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